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Traditional software-based protection methods are insecure against cloud 
operators/service providers related attacks. This is due to the fact that cloud service 
providers physically own the hardware that hosts users’ data and computation. Therefore, 
cloud computing is not achieving maximum growth since sensitive data are not going to 
be processed in the cloud. A hardware solution is the most valid method that would 
possibly tackle the problem and expand the use of cloud computing paradigm. In the 
literature, protecting users’ data in the cloud has been an active research area. Significant 
progress has been made in securing clients’ data in the cloud in the last few years. 
However, existing research either is mostly concerned with traditional attacks that are not 
targeting the new emerging threat (i.e. securing data from cloud providers and other users 
in the cloud) or lacks the practicality in the multi-tenant environment or suffering from 
security weaknesses and large performance overhead. In this dissertation, we propose 
FPGA-based solutions for securing users’ data from cloud providers and other various 
kinds of attacks. The proposed solutions are suitable for the multi-tenant nature of the 




dissertation can target two primary areas: (1) securing sensitive data that are owned by a 
client who performs the computation on his data in the cloud, (2) securing sensitive data 
that are aggregated from multiple sources and processed in the cloud such as internet of 
things (IoT) data that is collected from IoT devices. We propose a secure way to 
aggregate and process such data in the cloud and give its software and FPGA 
implementation details. The results show that the proposed solutions integrate well with 
other cloud resources and can boot 15 times faster than booting a medium-size 
conventional virtual machine (VM) on the same cloud and their performance is 
comparable to a software processing plaintext data. For secure IoT data processing in the 
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  العامةحلول هاردوير لحماية بيانات المستخدم في الحوسبة السحابية  : عنوان الرسالة
 علوم وهندسة الحاسب اآللي التخصص:
 2017 مايو :العلميةتاريخ الدرجة 
 
طرق الحماية التقليدية القائمة على البرمجيات غير آمنة ضد مشغلي السحابة والهجمات ذات الصلة. ويرجع ذلك إلى حقيقة أن 
والتي تقوم باداء العمليات عليها. ولذلك، فإن مقدمي الخدمات السحابية يمتلكون األجهزة التي تستضيف بيانات المستخدمين 
الحوسبة السحابية ال تحقق أقصى قدر من النمو حيث ان البيانات الحساسة لن يتم وضعها في السحابة االلكترونية. استخدام 
ان حماية بيانات  الهاردوير هو األسلوب األكثر فعالية والذي من المحتمل أن يعالج المشكلة ويوسع استخدام الحوسبة السحابية.
المستخدمين في السحابة مجاال بحثيا نشطا وقد أحرز تقدم كبير في تأمين بيانات العمالء في السحابة في السنوات القليلة 
الماضية. ومع ذلك، فإن البحوث الحالية تتعلق في الغالب بالهجمات التقليدية التي ال تستهدف التهديد الجديد الناشئ )أي تأمين 
من مشغلي الخدمات السحابية وغيرهم من المستخدمين في السحابة( أو تفتقر إلى التطبيق العملي في بيئة السحابة  البيانات
 يطروحة، نقترح الحلول القائمة علالمتعددة أو تعاني من نقاط ضعف أمنية او اداء ضعيف يجعلها غير عملية. في هذه األ
FPGA ابة وغيرها من أنواع مختلفة من الهجمات. الحلول المقترحة هي مناسبة لحماية بيانات المستخدمين من مشغلي السح
لطبيعة العمليات في السحابة وهي عملية من حيث التكلفة واألداء. يمكن للحلول المقترحة في هذه الرسالة أن تستهدف مجالين 
( تأمين 2لعمليات على بياناته في السحابة، )( تأمين البيانات الحساسة التي يملكها العميل الذي يقوم بإجراء ا1رئيسيين هما: )
البيانات الحساسة التي يتم تجميعها من مصادر متعددة ومعالجتها في السحابة مثل بيانات إنترنت األشياء التي يتم جمعها من 
 فيذ الطريقة فيأجهزة مختلفة. واقترحنا طريقة آمنة لتجميع ومعالجة هذه البيانات في السحابة وفصلنا برامجها و تفاصيل تن
FPGA  مرة  15وأظهرت النتائج أن الحلول المقترحة تتكامل بشكل جيد مع موارد السحابة األخرى ويمكن أن تبدأ أسرع ب
مقارنة بالبرمجيات االفتراضية التقليدية متوسطة الحجم على نفس السحابة وأداءها يمكن مقارنته مع معالجة البيانات الغير 
معالجة بيانات إنترنت االشياء في السحابة، أظهرت النتائج أيضا أن حلنا المقترخ فعال من حيث استهالك مشفرة. ولتحسين 






1 CHAPTER  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
Cloud computing is an emerging paradigm that has many benefits for users and 
enterprises. Reduction of capital costs, which is one of the essential benefits of cloud 
computing, makes cloud computing the ultimate choice for enterprises. However, cloud 
security is a major concern that makes cloud computing not appropriate for applications 
with sensitive data such as financial data processing, medical data and sensitive internet 
of things (IoT) data. Existing solutions either focus on protecting users' data against 
external or peer attacks only or lack a more robust attack model. There is an implied 
assumption that the cloud operator is a trusted entity. This leads many organizations with 
sensitive data not to process such data in the cloud. 
Current cloud infrastructures are not fully secured since the cloud provider has access to 
users’ data on the cloud servers. According to ESG Insider Threats Survey [1], insider 
attacks, which is carried by a staff in the cloud company, was ranked at third most 
dangerous attacks of the cloud. Also, 66% of all organizations are very vulnerable to 
insider attacks methods [1]. Furthermore, 53% of respondents of US State of Cybercrime 
Survey confessed that damages caused by the insider attacks affect their business more 





can extract RSA and AES keys in Amazon’s cloud by exploiting shared caches [3]. 
Another case occurred at Twitter when many companies documents were revealed by 
Twitter administrator’s account that was hacked by a malicious insider [4]. Therefore, 
there is a need for an effective solution that could build the trust between cloud service 
providers and the clients so that enterprises take advantage of the cloud to reduce their 
capital cost and economies of scale. 
  
1.2 Problem Definition and Dissertation Contributions 
The dissertation addresses the problem of protecting sensitive data processing in the 
cloud. The challenge of the problem is that the sensitive data need to be processed in a 
hardware resource owned by the cloud such that no one, even the hardware resource 
owner (i.e. the cloud provider), can disclose it while processing. The client outsources the 
sensitive data to be processed by hardware resources owned by the cloud, such as field-
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), and under the cloud premises, uses software 
provided by the cloud to authenticate the hardware resource, securely sends the FPGA 
application that is owned (partially or totally) by the client or another party to the cloud 
and securely outsource the sensitive data. Securing sensitive data processing in the cloud 
is even more challenging when the data is collected from multiple sources (i.e. IoT 
devices) that are deployed in locations under the premises of some party and are owned 
by the client or another party.  
In this dissertation, FPGAs are utilized to secure sensitive data processing in the cloud. 





independent and secure compute resources within the cloud infrastructure. Therefore, 
clients can safely perform the computation of their sensitive data in the cloud in a secure 
manner while utilizing the benefits of the cloud and the fast and secure computation of 
the FPGAs. Sensitive data can be farmed out from the untrusted cloud servers to FPGAs, 
which are configured by the client’s application, for secure processing. Compared to 
conventional software-based systems, the attack surface is substantially smaller and 
better defined. This is because FPGA configuration does not require the involvement of 
operating systems, drivers or compilers, making them suitable to build security solution 
under more robust attack models and stronger security guarantees. Further, FPGAs can 
build more sophisticated solutions for modern machine-to-machine communication, IoT 
data processing and big data applications [5].  As utilizing FPGAs for data protection in 
the cloud is either limited or unsecured in the literature, there is a substantial need for an 
efficient and secure FPGA schemes to protect sensitive data in the cloud. Other CPU 
based attempts to solve this problem are not fully secure, not suitable for on-cloud IoT 
data protection and suffer from large overhead that make them impractical for medium 
and big data secure processing. 
Hence, the dissertation has the following main contributions to address the problem of 
securely processing sensitive data in the cloud: 
• An efficient and practical FPGA-based scheme for securing client sensitive data 
processing in the cloud from various kinds of attacks (including malicious cloud 
providers) which has a very little area overhead and can be efficiently integrated with 





• A scheme for protecting third party’s intellectual properties (IPs) in the cloud. The 
scheme facilitates the use of IPs from third parties in the client applications who is 
not necessarily a hardware expert. 
• A security scheme for securing IoT sensitive data processing in the cloud and a 
symmetric proxy re-encryption scheme for IoT data on-cloud transformation. The 
scheme is suitable for publish/subscribe systems. It was evaluated and a complete 
FPGA prototype for the scheme and the proxy re-encryption is presented in this 
dissertation. 
 
1.3 Dissertation Outline 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: 
Chapter two presents a background in topics related to the contributions of this 
dissertation including cloud computing architectures, attack models and insider attacks in 
the cloud, an overview on trust in modern platforms, physically unclonable functions and 
proxy re-encryption. Chapter three reviews cloud computing security directions; 
including protecting users’ data from other tenants and protecting users’ data from the 
cloud provider. Chapter three also provides a literature review on the current research and 
products of trusted computing and secure processors. Chapter four presents an overview 
of the proposed security scheme for securing client data in the cloud. It also covers the 
FPGA implementation details and performance evaluation of our scheme. Chapter five 
covers the proposed scheme for IoT data protection in the cloud along with a symmetric 





also describes the existing IoT business models and presents the experimental results of 
our proposed cloud-integrated IoT scheme. Chapter five also discusses the performance 
results of the software and hardware implementations of our symmetric proxy re-






2 CHAPTER  
BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, we give an overview of architectures and management aspects in recent 
cloud platforms. We will then discuss attack models and demonstrate how a malicious 
insider could utilize these architectures to carry out attacks to users’ virtual machines and 
data. Further, we will provide an overview of topics that are related to this dissertation 
such as trusted computing, physically unclonable functions and proxy re-encryption. 
 
2.1 Overview of Cloud Architectures and Management  
The architecture of a cloud computing can roughly be categorized into four layers: the 
application layer, the platform layer, the virtualization layer and the hardware layer as 
shown in Figure 1.  
The application layer: this layer is at the top of the hierarchy and consists of cloud 
applications. Cloud applications have the interesting characteristics of availability, lower 
operating cost compared to conventional applications, and automatic-scaling feature, 
which maintains applications’ availability and allows an application to scale its capacity 
up and down to satisfy its needs. 
The platform layer: operating systems and software framework lie in this layer. The 





Figure 1: Cloud computing architecture [191]  
simpler. For example, Microsoft Azure works at the platform layer to provide support for 
storage, and database for applications in the application layer. 
The virtualization layer: Also known as the infrastructure layer, assigns computing 
resources and storage to the target virtual machine by dividing the hardware resources 
using virtualization technologies (called hypervisors) such as Xen [6] and KVM [7]. The 
virtualization layer is an important layer in the cloud computing architecture because it 
involves many recent topics related to the overall design of the cloud, such as dynamic 
resource allocation. Indeed, this layer is essential in terms of security of the cloud. As it is 
just above the hardware layer, any security solution would be brought down to the 
hardware layer. 
The hardware layer: the hardware layer is responsible for managing the hardware 
resources of the cloud, such as physical servers, power, cooling systems, routers, and 
switches. This layer is implemented as what is called data centers in practice. The data 
center consists of thousands of servers organized in racks. These racks are interconnected 













Cloud computing architecture is modular and every architectural layer is loosely coupled 
with the layers above or below. This modularity allows layers to change separately 
similar to the design of the OSI model for network protocols. Conceptually, each layer 
can be seen as a client of the layer below and each layer can be implemented as a service 
to the above layer. Though, clouds offer services, in practice, they are gathered into three 
categories: infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and software as 
a service (SaaS). IaaS denotes the provisioning of resources infrastructure. PaaS is for 
providing operating systems and software development frameworks. SaaS provides 
applications over the Internet. Users interact with the cloud using the web interface, 
which shows the SaaS. Then, the requests from the users are processed and deployed by 
PaaS and IaaS [8]. The business model of cloud computing is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Business model of cloud computing 
 
End User 
Service Provider (SaaS) 







Mostly, the job of cloud providers is to manage the hardware resources, i.e. compute, 
network and storage resources that form the infrastructure of the cloud. Management of 
these resources can be classified into seven areas [9]: 
• Global scheduling of virtualized resources: refers to the system-wide monitoring 
of virtual resources and the underline hardware resources consistent with cloud 
providers goals. 
• Resource utilization estimation: This is necessary for both the cloud provider and 
the client because it increases the utilization of the physical and virtualized 
resources.  
• Resource pricing and profit maximization: This is due to the nature of pricing 
used in the cloud. As the resource consumption is decreased, the cost is also 
decreased and vice versa. Hence, resource pricing needs to be managed in a 
proper way. 
• Local scheduling of cloud resources: This type of scheduling is similar to 
operating system scheduler. It deals with one server, hosting multiple virtual 
machines, and schedules requests to the physical resources of the server such as 
CPU and memory. 
• Application scaling and provisioning: To increase the performance of the service 
for large applications. 
• Workload management: This is due to the fact the cloud user might be a business 
enterprise and hence the workload request from the enterprise users have to meet 
certain requirements from cloud user. 





2.2 Overview of Attack Models and Insider Attacks in the Cloud 
This section discusses attack models, which are classified into cryptographic attacks, 
network attacks and physical attacks, and cloud insider attacks as well as cloud 
cryptographic algorithms. 
 
 Cryptographic Attacks 
Known-plaintext attack (KPA) is a type of attack which assumes that the attacker has the 
ciphertext and at least a limited number of samples of the corresponding plaintext. An 
example of such attack is the use of the encrypted bitstream and the unencrypted 
bitstream to extract the key embedded in the Xilinx FPGAs [10]. 
In Chosen-plaintext attack (CPA), the attacker specifies an arbitrary input plaintext and 
forces the encryption engine to produce the resulted ciphertext. Using the plaintext and 
the corresponding ciphertext, the attacker can infer information about the encryption 
algorithm and the key used for encryption. As an example, consider a file storage system 
that uses the same key to encrypt/decrypt users’ files. The attacker can encrypt a file and 
obtain the corresponding encrypted file. Using these files, the attacker can extract the key 
used for encryption and use it to decrypt other users’ files. 
There are two types of chosen-plaintext attack, adaptive chosen-plaintext attack and batch 
chosen-plaintext attack. In the adaptive chosen-plaintext attack, the attacker can encrypt 
more plaintexts and obtain the ciphertexts of these plaintexts. The attacker has the 





the encryption engine. In batch chosen-plaintext attack, the attacker encrypts all of the 
plaintext before obtaining any ciphertext. 
To differentiate between KPA and CPA, if the attacker is able to obtain a pair of plaintext 
and ciphertext, but not any specific pairs, then the attack is KPA and if the attacker is 
required to give input plaintext and obtain the corresponding ciphertext, then the attack is 
CPA. Note that KPA is a special kind of CPA. 
Ciphertext-only attack (COA) is a type of attacks in which it is assumed that the attacker 
can obtain the ciphertext only and the plaintext is not accessible by the attacker. COA can 
happen most likely in real life cryptanalysis. However, it is the weakest attack because 
the attacker lacks information and only the ciphertext is available for him. Therefore, 
COA is typically the hardest to design and at the same time the easiest to implement. 
Exhaustive key search or brute force attack is an example of COA, in which all keys are 
tried by the attacker until the correct key is found. The success of COA depends on the 
length of the key and does not depend only on the cipher strength or the type of the cipher 
being used.  
Chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) is the opposite of CPA and the attacker chooses a 
ciphertext and obtains the corresponding plaintexts. This enables the attacker to 
investigate different portions of the plaintext state space and may enable him to find 
vulnerabilities. Types of CCA include lunchtime attack and adaptive chosen-ciphertext 
attack. The attacker in lunchtime attack have access to a limited ciphertexts and plaintexts 
pairs. The attacker in adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack can pick a sequence of 
ciphertexts to be decrypted and obtains the ciphertexts. For further steps, he has the 





The open key attack model assumes that the attacker has some knowledge about the key 
used for encryption/decryption. Related-key attack is an attack of such model and the 
attacker uses a key that is related mathematically to the target key to encrypt the plaintext 
and access the ciphertext. Known-key distinguishing attack is another type of open key 
model and the attacker chooses a key and study the cipher and distinguishes between a 
random data and a ciphertext. 
 
 Network Attacks 
Network attacks include wiretapping, port scan, idle scan, man-in-the-middle, 
impersonation, replay, ARP poisoning, ping flood, ping of death and Smurf attacks. 
Wiretapping is a clear example of network attacks and is effective when the data sent is 
unencrypted. In port scan attack, the attacker sends packets to the victim machine while 
varying the port in every packet in attempt to know which ports are open and to identify 
the operating system and the services in the victim machine. Idle scan attack is a kind of 
port scan attack on TCP ports and the attacker sends packets to TCP ports using 
impersonated machines (i.e. machines with their identity stolen) to identify and learn the 
services on the victim machine. 
ARP (address resolution protocol) is used to identify the MAC address of the target 
machine. The sender machine broadcasts a message over the network containing the IP 
address of the target machine. The target machine sends a reply containing its MAC 
address. ARP poisoning attack occurs when the attacker replaces the MAC address in the 





through the attacker machine. This attack is possible in local area networks that utilize 
ARP and can be used to launch other attacks such as denial of service attacks [11]. 
Ping flood is a type of denial of service attack in which an attacker sends ping packets to 
the victim machine as fast as possible without waiting for replies. The attack is more 
effective when the bandwidth of the attacker is more than the bandwidth of the victim. 
Ping of death happens when the attacker sends a ping packet that is larger than the bytes 
allowed by the IP protocol. The packet gets fragmented, sent and reassembled in the 
victim machine. When reassembled, buffer overflow occurs which causes system crash 
and allows injection of malicious code [12]. 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is part of the internet protocol suite and is 
used to send control messages such as error and ping messages. The attacker in Smurf 
attack spoofs the IP address of the victim machine and broadcasts large ICMP messages 
to the network using this IP address. If number of machines in the network is large, the 







 Physical Attacks 
Physical attacks are divided into invasive, non-invasive and semi-invasive attacks [14]. 
Invasive attacks are hardware attacks that require manipulation of the physical properties 
of the chip. Non-invasive attacks are similar to invasive attacks but do not damage the 
chip package. Semi-invasive attacks are relatively new type of attacks that require 
depackaging the chip, similar to invasive attacks, but do not create contacts with internal 
chip lines. 
Invasive attacks require expensive equipment, knowledge and time. A well-known attack 
of this type is miroprobing; where a needle is attached onto the internal wires of the chip 
to extract the chip secrets. Non-invasive attacks require moderate level of equipment and 
knowledge to implement. Non-invasive attacks include side-channel, brute force, fault 
injection and data remanence attacks [15].  
Side-channel attack is any attack that use data about the encryption or decryption process 
to break the system such as using the noise created by encryption engines or measuring 
the time of various computations. Side channel attack includes, generally, cache, timing, 
power analysis and electromagnetic attacks. Cache attack is based on monitoring cache 
accesses made by the user in a shared environment such as cloud servers. Timing attack 
is based on measuring the time it takes to do the operation such as measuring how many 
cycles a memory access take to identify whether the access is read or write. Power 
analysis attack makes use of power consumption that is varied by the hardware during 
computation. Power analysis attacks is classified into simple power analysis (SPA) and 
differential power analysis (DPA). SPA obtains the information directly from the power 





power variations by observing differences between traces of different operations and 
statistical analysis is applied to obtain the secrets from noisy measurements that are 
difficult to analyze using SPA. Electromagnetic attack is based on electromagnetic 
radiation, which can provide information about plaintexts and may directly disclose the 
plaintext and other information. Fault injection can be used to exploit the erroneous result 
or unexpected behavior of the chip to extract its secrets. Data remanence is the sensitive 
data that is read by the attacker but is supposed to be erased [15].  
Semi-invasive attacks use ultraviolet (UV) light, X-rays and other light sources to disturb 
chip operations and extract sensitive information. Attacks of this type include UV, optical 
fault injection, and optical side-channel Attack [16]. 
There are a number of attacks that are targeting FPGAs such as Reverse Engineering, 
Tampering, Cloning, Counterfeiting, and Crippling attacks. Reverse Engineering can 
cause bypassing security measures of the configuration. An adversary can study the 
configuration blocks and replace security components by his own malicious components 
in order to disclose configuration secrets and sensitive data. Tampering is a special type 
of reverse engineering, where the adversary modifies the configuration to gain access to 
its secret keys or interrupt its functionality or disclose its data. Hardware Trojans are a 
clear example of tampering [17]. Cloning attack occurs when an exact copy of the FPGA 
configuration is created by an adversary. Counterfeiting attack is an extension to the 
cloning attack and it occurs when all FPGAs of the same family and size are identical. 
Thus, a configuration made for one device can be used with another. This can be easily 
done in the cloud environment [18]. The details of the design do not need to be known by 





compromising the FPGA to insert a snooping circuitry to disclose FPGA secrets and 
therefore disclose users’ data. Crippling attacks are similar to denial of service attacks on 
networked servers. The attacker re-configures the FPGA with an invalid configuration to 
bring the FPGA system offline [19]. 
 
 Insider Attacks in the Cloud 
How a malicious insider (MI), who could be an employee in the cloud, could carry 
attacks to users data of the cloud was reported by many survey publications, such as 
[20][21]. An MI could utilize the system to carry out various kinds of attacks depending 
on his position in the cloud. An administrator who can manage client’s virtual machines 
(VMs), for instance, can do anything to the VM he is managing. Similarly, an employee 
working in cloud hypervisors might inject a code to monitor all the activities of client’s 
VMs on the underlying hardware [20]. Memory Dump Scanning, Templates Poisoning 
and Snapshot Cracking are examples of exploiting client’s information in the cloud [21]. 
Dumping the memory to get sensitive information is called Memory Dump Scanning 
attack; the MI can easily dump the memory to a flash or external storage. Although the 
retrieved data would be large and sensitive data is concealed in hundreds of megabytes of 
data, the MI usually use techniques such as social engineering, which count on human 
communication and involves tricking them into breaking security measures, to extract the 
critical data. 
Cloud providers usually provide templates for the virtual machines images to be created 





template could be downloaded and analyzed by an employee; passively revealing VM 
owners’ sensitive data. This attack is relevant to many platforms and is also applicable to 
OpenStack which is the top open source cloud computing technology in 2014 [22]. 
Cloud providers manage the users and passwords of the VMs in a normal manner, 
assuming trust of their staff. Not all VMs disks are encrypted due to many difficulties 
facing disk encryption such as sharing resources with other tenants [23]. If an MI is a VM 
administrator, he can easily make an attack on that VM by simply reading all the required 
information from the unencrypted information. 
 
 Cryptographic Algorithms for Cloud Computing 
This section reviews cryptographic algorithms used or preferred in the cloud. According 
to Soofi et al. [24], most approaches are based on RSA encryption. 60% out of the 30% 
RSA encryption techniques results are validated by experiments. Figure 3 below depicts 
the use of encryption algorithms in the cloud. Patwal and Mittal [25] also reported that 







Figure 3: Percentage of use of various encryption algorithms in the cloud 
 
An algorithm called Diffie–Hellman–Merkle key exchange (DH) was invented by Ralph 
Merkle for sharing a key between two parties over unsecured channels [26], [27]. The 
secret key can then be used as a session key to encrypt/decrypt the data the two parties 
want to send/receive. The algorithm works as follows: 
Let the two parties be A and B. 
A and B agree on a prime number p and base g (which is normally a small number such 
as 2). 
A chooses an integer a and sends B ga mod p. 
B chooses an integer b and sends A gb mod p. 
A computes K = (gb mod p)a mod p 
B computes K = (ga mod p)b mod p 





All values except a and b are non-secret and can be sent between the two parties. For 
example, if A and B agrees on p to be 23 and g to be 5, then A chooses a = 6 and sends B 
the value 8 and B chooses b = 15 and sends A the value 19. K then will be 196 mod 23 
=815 mod 23 = 2 which is the secret they now share. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman can be 
used such that every time A and B share a secret, different shared key is created enabling 
what is called perfect forward secrecy, which means that even if the private keys are 
compromised, past communications are still secure. 
Leading cloud computing platforms use the DH such as OpenStack [28], which uses this 
algorithm for key sharing between its components. The DH is one of the best protocols of 
sharing keys between parties and in this dissertation, we make use of its basic principle 
for key sharing between FPGAs and other parties because of its lightweight computation 
which is suitable for cloud computing and IoT. 
  
2.3 Trusted Computing 
The Trusted Computing Group had developed the Trusted Computing (TC) technology. 
TC is an attempt to ensure that computers will behave as expected and this behavior 
would be enforced by hardware and software. The enforcement is achieved by including 
a special chip integrated with computers’ hardware, which includes unique, inaccessible 
by other components of the system, encryption keys. The concept of trusted computing 
leads to the fact that the hardware of the system is theoretically secure from all kinds of 





Trusted computing is implemented in practice as a hardware component attached to other 
hardware components of computer assets, in addition to software drivers. Trusted 
computing witnessed a remarkable success in personal computers. Unfortunately, it is in 
its early stages in cloud computing because the intention of trusted computing was not 
targeting virtualization [30]. The most common and most widely used hardware 
component is the trusted platform module (TPM). Hence, we will consider, in the 
following subsections, the TPM in our discussion and will discuss the implications of 
using the TPM in the cloud paradigm. 
 
 Trusted Platform Module  
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a special chip issued by the Trusted Computing 
Group (TCG) to secure hardware by embedding cryptographic keys into devices. The 
TPM was developed to provide device identification, authentication, measurement, 
encryption, and device integrity. Software can use the TPM to authenticate hardware 
devices and the TPM is capable of monitoring and reporting configuration state by using 
the main bus of the computer from the point of computer power-up. 
A TPM has at least 16 Platform Configuration Registers (PCR registers), which are 
initialized to a known value when the machine is rebooted. The values of these registers 
cannot be arbitrarily set. The values of the PCR registers can be retrieved from the TPM 
by issuing the TPM Quote operation.  
The TPM is mainly used to create a foundation of trust of the software installed in the 





(SRTM) performs a chain of measurements, starting when the host platform is reset, of 
the components and configuration data involved in the system boot while the Dynamic 
Root of Trust Measurement (DRTM) is the process of taking the measurements while the 
system is running. Each component measures the next component before passing the 
control to it, forming what is called a Chain of Trust (CoT). The CoT, at least, involves 
the BIOS, the boot loader and the operating system kernel. The resulting measurements 
must be always the same unless the boot components are modified. The combination of 
the TPM Quote operation and the SRTM process, allows the remote attestation of the 
host [32]. An external attester can request a TPM Quote of the PCRs, and compare the 
obtained values with a baseline of the PCR values of the system generated when it was in 
a trusted state.  
There are three keys produced by the TPM; Endorsement Key (EK), Storage Root Key 
(SRK) and Attestation Identity Keys (AIK). The Endorsement Key is created by the TPM 
manufacturer and is never released outside of the TPM. EK is used to ensure that the data 
was encrypted by the TPM (the data can be trusted). A private EK which is used to 
encrypt the data can be proven to be from the TPM by using it to decrypt a value that has 
been encrypted with the public EK. When the TPM is initialized by the user, in the 
process of taking the TPM ownership, the SRK is generated. It is used to protect TPM 
keys created by applications, so that these keys cannot be used without the TPM (all the 
keys the user requests are produced by the SRK). Finally, the AIK are used as an alias of 
the EK for signing information produced by the TPM, e.g. the PCR register values issued 





bus between it and other computer components and most of the attacks are actually 
carried out from this unsecure bus [33].  
 
 Intel Trusted Execution Technology 
Intel’s Trusted Execution Technology [34] is a technology developed to provide 
attestation of a platform and the operating system running in that platform and to ensure 
that the OS starts in a trusted environment. TXT relies on the TPM and another chip to 
provide the measurements of the platform components and the software. TXT aim is to 
provide an isolated environment for VMs from untrusted software by providing the VM 
control over the platform while it is active. A warm system reset is performed by the 
authenticated code module (SINIT ACM) before starting the VM. The TPM measures the 
hardware and updates the SRTM registers and when the VM is initialized, it updates the 
DRTM registers. Therefore, the VM can start from a valid state and can execute in a 
trusted environment. Similar to the TPMs, TXT is vulnerable to physical DRAM attacks 
since DRAM encryption is not implemented. The System Management Mode (SMM) is 
the most privileged execution mode in which all executions are suspended and only a 
special software stored inside a firmware (stored in a ROM and is theoretically 
inaccessible by the operating system or applications) is executed. Several attacks were 
reported to the SMM such as [35]–[39], which leads to granting an attacker access to all 






 Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) 
Intel SGX follows the approach in Figure 4 below. Data owner has the measurement of 
the initial state as he computes its hash locally by creating the exact container (or 
enclave) in his local machine. The attestation key (the private part of it) is used to sign 
the hash M, gA and gB and it is decrypted by the data owner by the AK public key, which 
is publicly available and is certified using the Endorsement Certificate (only the public 
key can verify information signed with the private key). The hash is done for the initial 
state only and any other code or data that will be received later will not be measured. 
After successfully attesting the container and sharing K using Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange, the data owner sends the code and the data encrypted to the enclave using K. 
 
 






The Data owner creates an enclave in his local machine using ECREATE instruction, 
Figure 5. ECREATE instruction will result in reserving part of the virtual address space 
for the enclave, creating an isolated part in the Processor Reserved Memory (PRM) called 
enclave page cache (EPC) and its Metadata (EPCM). EPCM is used to store information 




Figure 5: Creating an enclave [41] 
 
Data owner then executes EADD instruction, Figure 6, to copy the required pages to the 
enclave area one by one. MRECNLAVE is a measurement register to store the 







(MRECNLAVE) used in the software attestation process. The SGX Enclave Control 
Structure (SECS) is inside the EPC and stores enclave metadata and is used by the CPU 
for the enclave identity. 
 
 
Figure 6: Copying enclave pages to the EPC [41] 
 
Other instructions are shown in Figure 7. The EINIT instruction marks the enclave’s 
SECS as initialized. Setting INIT to true means that EADD cannot be invoked on that 
enclave anymore and MRENCLAVE will hold the final measurement. The EENTER 
instruction is used to execute enclave code. The EEXIT instruction is used when the 
enclave code finishes performing its task to return the execution control to the process 









Figure 7: Enclave instructions [41] 
 
The code and data are unencrypted inside the CPU package and if the code/data leaves 
the CPU package, they are encrypted using a symmetric key randomly generated on 










Figure 8: Code/data are encrypted outside the CPU package [41] 
 
To run the enclave in a remote host, the same procedures described above are done in the 
remote host. Hence, the same value of MRENCLAVE will be produce by the remote 
host. Data owner can remotely attest MRENCLAVE value and compare it with his own 
value. As a result of the remote attestation process (as in Figure 4), a symmetric key can 
be shared and this key can be used to send encrypted data to/from the enclave.  
 
2.4 Physically Unclonable Functions 
Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) topic is one of the hottest topics in the field of 
chip authentication and reconfigurable computing. PUFs are functions that make use of 
the manufacturing process variations to uniquely identify devices. These variations 
cannot be controlled and therefore making PUFs behavior and response unpredictable. 





challenge is applied, should have a response that is unique (a device response should not 
match a response from another device), steady (when the same challenge is applied the 
device should give the same response), random (is based on uncontrolled variations and 




Figure 9: PUFs challenge response 
 
PUFs can be classified into two categories; PUFs using explicitly-introduced randomness 
and PUFs using intrinsic randomness. Optical PUF and Coating PUF are two different 
types of PUFs using explicitly-introduced randomness. Optical PUF was one of the first 
attempts in producing unique identifiers for integrated circuits (ICs) and is formed when 
a transparent material is doped and when a laser beam is induced to the material at certain 
angle, a unique and random pattern is formed. This pattern is very difficult to duplicate 






requires laser setup and a complex mechanical system to position the laser beam [42]. On 
the other side, Coating PUF is built when a network of wires is created on the top layer of 
an IC. The space between the wires is filled with a material and doped with dielectric 
particles randomly. Therefore, the capacitance between these wires would be random; 
creating a unique identifier for the device [43].  
PUFs using intrinsic randomness do not require modifications to the manufacturing 
process and therefore are highly attractive. PUFs of this type can be divided into a delay-
based PUFs and memory-based PUFs. Delay-based PUFs include Arbiter PUF [44], Ring 
oscillator PUF [45] and Glitch PUF [46] and memory-based PUFs include Butterfly PUF 
[47] and SRAM PUF [48]. Arbiter PUF is based on two parallel racing paths with an 
arbiter at the end of the two paths. A signal is applied simultaneously to the two paths and 
the resulting analog delay difference is processed by the arbiter to get the required digital 
value. Ring oscillator PUF utilize the delay characteristics of multiple ring oscillators and 
a comparison of them is made to produce the digital value. SRAM PUF and Butterfly 
PUF are called memory-based PUFs. SRAM PUF [49] makes use of the initial values of 
the SRAM cells as these initial values are different from chip to chip due to the variations 
in the manufacturing processes, in which the state of the bit at power up determines its 
initial value. Butterfly PUF is an emulation of SRAM PUF in FPGAs. 
PUFs in FPGAs include Arbiter PUF [44], Ring oscillator PUF [45]; enhanced by many 
other publications such as [50]–[53], Anderson PUF proposed by J.H. Anderson [54], 
Butterfly PUF [47], and SRAM PUF. Anderson PUF is considered as Glitch PUF and is 
based on the delay of lookup tables (LUTs) in shift register mode and carry chain 





SRAM PUF was made possible using recent Xilinx [55] and Altera devices [56]. In this 
dissertation, we assume the use of the SRAM PUF for generating random numbers as 
other PUFs are currently suffering from low stability, uniqueness, and entropy compared 
to SRAM PUF [57].  
Although many types of the PUFs can be implemented using most of nowadays FPGAs, 
we believe that most of these PUFs are still facing many drawbacks when used in FPGAs 
and we though recommend the use of SRAM PUFs as it is considered more appropriate 
for FPGAs and are already available in recent FPGA devices [56]. 
 
2.5 Proxy Re-encryption 
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) is a method for transforming a ciphertext c1 encrypted using a 
key (K1) to another ciphertext c2, which can be decrypted using a key (K2), without 
decrypting/disclosing the plaintext during the transformation. The benefit from such 
transformation is that the time for transformation is less compared to decrypt-then-
encrypt and the transformation does not expose the plaintext, which means that the entity 
that does the transformation (i.e. the proxy) is not necessarily trusted. PRE was first 
introduced by Mambo and Okamoto [58] and later Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss [59] 
proposed the BBS scheme in which a semi-trusted proxy converts a ciphertext encrypted 
by user’s A public key to another ciphertext to be decrypted by user’s B private key. 
Semi-trusted in this context means that the proxy will correctly execute the code required 
for the conversion and does not mean that users A and B trust it partially. The conversion 





BBS was improved by Ateniese et al. [60] and many other public key based PREs were 
proposed such as [61] [62] [63] [64]. These public key based PRE methods are used 
when the delegator (user A) is for some reason unwilling to receive the data and want to 
give delegation to another party (user B) to decrypt the data without revealing his private 
key to user b or the semi-trusted proxy. For example, a manager wishes to give 
delegation for his employee to check his email messages without giving him his private 
key. The manager gives a re-encryption key to the email server so that the messages are 
converted by the email server and his employee can decrypt the data without fully 
trusting the email server or giving the employee the manger private key. Symmetric key 
based PRE scheme was proposed by Syalim et al. [65]. The scheme uses the all-or-
nothing transform [66] which means that the ciphertext cannot be decrypting if any part 
of it is missing. However, the scheme requires the generation of 8 keys to do the 
conversion and these keys had to be shared between the two communicating parties and 
the proxy; making the conversion complicated. The preferred properties of the PRE are: 
1- Unidirectional: a PRE scheme is unidirectional if the proxy is able to transfer 
delegator ciphertext to the delegatee ciphertext but not the opposite. 
2- Non-transitive: The proxy cannot give the delegation alone to a third user C from 
the re-encryption keys of users A and B. for example, user A gives re-encryption 
key (rK1) to delegate the rights to user B and user B gives re-encryption key 
(rK2) to delegate the rights to user C. Then the proxy cannot give the delegation 
rights of user A to user C by using rK1 and rK2. 
3- Collusion-resistant: if the proxy and another user collude, they cannot obtain the 





4- Non-interactive: when the private key of the delegatee is not required to create the 
re-encryption key, then the PRE is non-interactive. 
5- Multi-use/Single-use: if only the original ciphertext can be re-encrypted, then the 
PRE is single-use and the opposite is correct for multi-use. 
6- Key-privacy: if the identity of the delegator and the delegatee cannot be identified 
by the proxy from the re-encryption keys and the ciphertext, then the PRE is key-
private. 
7- Transparent: a PRE is transparent if the delegatee is unable to note the existence 
of the proxy between him and the delegator. 
8- Key-optimal: the PRE is key-optimal if it is required to store small amount of data 
(the private keys only). 
9- Temporary: if the delegator can delete the decryption rights after some time, then 






3 CHAPTER  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, we will discuss recent contributions related to securing users’ data in the 
cloud. This includes surveying the techniques published in securing users’ data from both 
other cloud clients and the cloud providers. We will also investigate recent advances in 
trusted computing as it is a fundamental topic in outsourced data secure processing. 
Finally, we explore secure processors and their implementation methods.  
 
3.1 Protecting Users’ Data from Other Users  
Protecting users’ data from other cloud users requires securing user’s virtual machines 
form other virtual machines in the same cloud server. There are two lines of research 
heavily investigated in the literature; securing hypervisors from being compromised and 
virtual machine isolation. 
Ferrie [67] described an attack scenario for identifying which hypervisor is being used to 
deploy the virtual machines. Leading hypervisors (QEMU, VirtualPC, Bochs, Parallels, 
Hydra and VMWare) were compromised using his scenario. The attack is based on 
specific unusual instructions that leads to raising exception that are not handled by the 
hypervisors. The work also provided a solution for each hypervisor by handling the 





Louis and Jordan discussed some of the vulnerabilities related to granting access to users’ 
metadata in hypervisors [70]. Among these attacks, redirecting data flows using firewall 
Ports, utilizing user application interface, hooking calls to library and hooking system 
calls were illustrated in detail. 
Breaking the isolation between virtual machines is also carried out on the weak parts of 
the hypervisor. This attack causes Denial of Service, System halt, and memory overflow. 
Attacks similar to this one were reported in many contributions in the literature such as 
[71]–[73].  
Fog computing and decoy methods were used intensively to protect users' data in the 
cloud. Fog computing relies on making distributed cloud resources such that the cloud 
parts (storage and servers) can be geographically closer to the user. Fog computing was 
mentioned to be more secure because it places the data geographically close to the end 
user and therefore certain policies can be applied to restrict access to cloud resources to 
users in the same geographic area [74]–[77]. Decoy files/documents are trap files that are 
used to trap illegitimate user. The search behavior of an illegitimate user is random to 
some extent when entering the system and when the trap file is hit, it will fire an alarm. If 
the alarm is a false positive, the legitimate user will be challenged with a question and his 
legitimacy will be checked.  
Several attempts were carried out to tackle the attacks to users’ data from other users 
using Fog computing and Decoy method and these techniques are not helpful for tackling 
attacks from the providers of the cloud since the architecture of the cloud itself is being 
ignored as well as dumping the memory of cloud servers. Most previous studies are 





all of the attacks discussed in this section is that attackers utilize a weakness in the 
software such as the hypervisor. Therefore, these types of attacks targeting other virtual 
machines in the cloud are not new and are not specific to the cloud; unlike attacks from 
cloud staff. Attackers utilize vulnerabilities to attack users’ data and cloud providers 
close the vulnerabilities and this process continues until the probability of finding a 
vulnerability is close to zero. Many software attempts exist in the literature targeting 
these kinds of externally considered attacks which obviously assumes that cloud 
providers are trusted [78]–[83]. 
Table 1 summarizes the existing SW approaches for protecting data in the cloud. All 
approaches are not secure against cloud insider attacks and completely ignore attacks that 








Table 1: Summery of SW approaches targeting data protection in the cloud 














2012-2016    - 
Decoy files [74]–[76] 2014    - 
Neural 
networks 




2013-2016     
 
3.2 Protecting Users’ Data from Cloud Providers  
Homomorphic encryption is the process of performing computation on ciphertext and the 
encrypted result when decrypted matches the expected result of the computation 
performed on plaintext [93]. Homomorphic encryption could be the solution to the 
problem of securing clients’ data in the cloud. However, to date, no homomorphic 
encryption algorithm that is computationally achievable has been developed [94]. From 
the cloud perspective, scalability of the solution is a major feature in the cloud and using 
homomorphic encryption systems with their computation cost would contradict this 
feature [95]. Furthermore, most of the new homomorphic encryption algorithms such as 





by the cryptography community when compared to other popular algorithms such as RSA 
and AES [95].  
To protect circuit IPs (intellectual properties) of third parties and prevent cloning, FPGA 
vendors provide a symmetric key embedded on the FPGA to secure bitstreams. Clients 
use the vendor’s SW tool to encrypt their bitstreams (i.e. FPGA configuration) which 
would then be decrypted inside the FPGA. Data could also be included or initialized 
within the bitstream which makes it secure. After the data is processed, it can be readback 
as part of the bitstream (which is encrypted by the FPGA before it is outputted). Again, 
the vendor’s SW would decrypt the data for the client. There are many problems with this 
approach. First, these keys are only made available by the FPGA vendors to major clients 
only under very rigorous qualification requirements. Second, large data cannot be 
initialized in the FPGA due to limited space resources. Third, the configuration process is 
extremely slower than the FPGA’s processing speed which means that almost all of the 
time would be spent on transferring data in and out of the FPGA, thus wasting the 
FPGA’s processing power.  Finally, and most importantly, many successful attacks 
against such a method have been reported, either using Known-plaintext attack (KPA) 
[10] or other types of attack [96]–[104]. 
Eguro and Venkatesan proposed an FPFA-based security approach for cloud computing 
[95]. This approach implements the security components as Static Logic (i.e. fixed, non-
reconfigurable macros) inside the FPGA and makes use of RSA and its private key to 
form a root of trust (ROT) inside the FPGA. A certificate authority (CA) would certify 
the public and private keys for every FPGA. The private key is a crucial component from 





obtained by reverse engineering the Static Logic or inserting a sniffing circuitry to sniff 
the private key since the RSA-based solution did not consider checking the integrity of 
the Static logic. 
Some researchers proposed providing trust for FPGA-based embedded systems by 
implementing a full Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [105] on the FPGA [106][107]. The 
use of TPMs assumes a secure channel and requires users to take ownership of the TPM 
and set a chain-of-trust. This is not only impractical in a multi-tenant cloud environment 
(where each user would need to take ownership of the TPM and set their own chain-of-
trust), but does not guard against Man-in-the-Middle (MiM) and replay attacks by a 
malicious cloud administrator. Analysis of virtualized TPMs (vTPMs) showed that they 
are less secure than physical TPMs (pTPMs) [108], even with a trusted host (i.e. the 
cloud). vTPMs have the same vulnerabilities to attacks by malicious cloud administrators 
as pTPMs.  
In [33], researchers proposed a data security model for users data that is similar to TPMs. 
They proposed augmenting the cloud’s servers with two types of chips that are paired 
(cryptographically) by the manufacturer; an FPGA as a processing chip and an ASIC as 
state chip that holds the state between power cycles (using non-volatile memory). The 
system guarantees integrity and freshness by maintaining a Merkle tree, which is a tree of 
hash values and the value of each node depends on the values of its child nodes, for 
user’s data in the cloud storage. However, no implementation was provided nor a 
performance evaluation. Furthermore, it is assumed that the FPGA is ‘securely’ packaged 
and that there is a secure channel between the state chip and the certificate authority. In 





integrity of the configured circuitry. Similar to the conventional pTPMs, this model is not 
suitable for the multi-tenancy nature of the cloud and have similar vulnerabilities to 
attacks by malicious cloud administrators. 
A framework for users’ data privacy (mainly for Map-Reduce applications) in the cloud 
using the security features of current FPGAs and proxy re-encryption was proposed in 
[109]. It uses public/private keys for encrypting/decrypting a symmetric key to be shared 
between the user and the FPGAs in the cloud for the purpose of data 
encryption/decryption. It also uses the FPGA’s embedded symmetric keys for bitstream 
protection, which is not only not available for general users, but was already proven to be 
insecure against KPA as stated earlier. In addition, the proposed scheme requires a CA to 
certify FPGAs public keys as well as a proxy server to manage key re-encryption. The 
scheme assumes full trust in the cloud user (who will get access to the FPGA’s 
symmetric keys) and semi-trust in the proxy and cloud operator. This is another major 
drawback of this scheme. Further, it is not clear why a proxy re-encryption was needed 
since it does not seem to have a real impact on the security of this framework. 
Specifically, a proxy is not needed since both the FPGA and the user have their own 
public/private keys and if there is a need for scheduling more than one FPGA for the 
user, the cloud provider can just send the public key of each FPGA (that is certified by 






3.3 Trusted Computing in the Cloud 
This section discusses the state-of-the-art in establishing trust in the cloud and reports the 
complexity of such establishment. It also describes Intel’s Software Guard Extensions 
(SGX) and its role in establishing trusted computing environment in remote hosts such as 
the cloud servers. 
Eisenbarth et al. proposed a reconfigurable architecture with TPMs [106]. The approach 
allows for scaling and updating the TPM functionalities and including it into the chain of 
trust which makes it possible to bind sensitive data to the reconfigurable hardware. This 
work used a fixed logic bitstream for enabling the root of trust and the FPGA boots from 
this bitstream. However, the problem of using partial reconfiguration to integrate the 
bitstream of the client with the fixed logic bitstream was not discussed. 
Developing a mechanism for the user to attest the state of the host by remotely attesting 
the TPM PCR registers was presented by Kekkonen et al. [110]. However, sharing the 
TPM among applications used by different users in the same platform was not addressed. 
The problem of extending trust to the cloud is an active area of research. Several 
publications attempted to propose trusted models for the cloud. In the rest of this 
subsection, we summarize these attempts and give our conclusions regarding trust in 
cloud computing environment. 
Santos et al. proposed the design of a trusted cloud computing platform (TCCP) that uses 
the TPM to provide trusted hardware [111]. However, the proposed platform was based 
on the TPM which is meant to be used per device and not per virtual machine. Another 





TPM to provide trusted computing, which is not suitable for multi-tenant nature of the 
cloud as stated earlier [112]. 
The virtualization of the TPM to bring its security properties to virtual environments is 
not direct due to its design and security constraints. This issue was discussed by Cucurull 
and Guasch [108] and an overview of virtualizing TPM in Xen QEMU virtualization 
solutions was provided. The idea of virtual TPM in Xen is simply an emulation of the 
TPM and there is a manger that control these emulations while QEMU uses the 
passthrough technique to achieve virtualization of the TPM. Passthrough is a simple 
method that passes all PCR registers of the TPM to the VM. Similar emulation was 
proposed by Bertholon et al. [113]. 
The possibility of using TPM to establish trust in Cloud Computing, between the cloud 
provider and the customers was also studied by Achemlal et al. [114]. Similar work was 
carried out by Berger and Caceres [115] and what they have proposed for virtualizing the 
TPM is shown in Figure 10. The disadvantage of this architecture is that TPM 
information sent to client VMs pass through the hypervisor which exposes the 
information to insider attacks. The proposed scheme by Berger and Caceres propagates 
the idea of the TPM to the software level which reduces the success of such methods. 







Figure 10: Virtual TPM Architecture of  [115]. 
 
Zic et al. [120] and Nepal et al. [116] proposed the Trusted Extension Device (TED) to 
enable mobile trust. Thilakanathan et al. used it to build the root of trust in the cloud 
[117] although one user was assumed for the TED to be integrated with the cloud servers, 
Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: The abstracted architecture of the trusted extension device (TED) 
 
TPM offers a robust way for providing trust in single machines although there are several 





design for cloud computing due to the fact that TPM role has to be extended to the 
software level which contradicts the goal of the TPM. 
  
 Intel Software Guard Extensions  
Recently, Intel announced the Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [121], which is a set of 
instructions to extend Intel architecture. SGX instructions aim to provide security-
sensitive computation integrity and confidentiality guarantees where privileged software 
such as the operating system (OS), the kernel and hypervisors are untrusted. To provide 
integrity and confidentiality, SGX allows user-level code to allocate private regions of 
memory, called enclaves, that is protected from other processes; including processes 
running at higher privilege levels. SGX also provides software attestation, which is the 
process of proving to the user that his code is running in the intended trusted hardware. 
The TPM attestation covers all the software in the platform while the TXT attestation, 
discussed in Section 2.3.2, covers the VM code. SGX attestation covers only the private 
code and data inside an enclave. SGX does not prevent side-channel attacks such as 
Cache-timing attacks, Physical attacks and Microcode attacks [122]. Successful cache 
attacks were reported by many researchers including [123]–[126]. The problem of such 
attacks in the cloud is that an enclave has the power to control the server and other users 
in the same server would be compromised; spreading the attack to insiders and outsiders. 
Moreover, Intel SGX requires modification to the application using it which is not 





3.4 Secure Processors  
In addition to Intel SGX, several secure processors were proposed in the literature. This 
section summarizes secure processors that are relevant to the topic of trusted computing.  
The Aegis secure processor [128] depends on a security kernel, which is a subset of the 
OS kernel, to isolate containers from each other by configuring the page tables used in 
address translation. The security kernel handles processes, virtual memory management, 
and hardware exceptions and uses processor’s features to protect itself from other 
components such as untrusted device drivers. Aegis’ security kernel is assumed to be a 
trusted part of the OS and it can evict the containers pages while verifying the paging 
operations correctness. This means that the OS can learn the memory access patterns of 
the container. Further, cache timing attacks can be carried on Aegis.  
The use of a trusted hypervisor to provide secure applications running untrusted systems 
was presented in the Bastion architecture [129]. The Bastion architecture allows the 
hypervisor to enforce the container to use specific memory locations by maintaining a 
Module State Table that stores a page table containing each physical memory page and its 
container and virtual address. The hypervisor checks that the virtual address used to map 
a physical memory page matches the virtual address associated with the physical address 
of this physical memory page in the Module State Table. Similar to other secure 
processors, the Bastion hypervisor is vulnerable to cache timing attacks and untrusted 
operating system can evict the container pages; allowing it to learn a container’s memory 
accesses. 
Sanctum [130] partition the DRAM into equal continuous regions to isolate the container 





performed to isolate the containers in the caches. Sanctum relies on a trusted security 
monitor, similar to the SMM, to ensure that the container can only reference to a memory 
inside its DRAM partition. The container manages its page table and also handle its page 
faults, which means that the OS cannot learn the virtual address causing the page fault. 
The Sanctum design does not protect against any physical attack and focuses on software 
attacks. Also, Sanctum does not prevent fault-injection attacks and timing attacks. 
The Ascend [131] and Phantom [132] secure processors make use of the oblivious RAM. 
Oblivious RAM is a concept that performs the reads and writes simultaneously to hide 
the operation being performed and shuffles the RAM contents from time to time to avoid 
observing the patterns of accessing the memory locations. It follows that Ascend and 
Phantom do not suffer from attacks that probe the DRAM address bus and other attacks 
that attempts to learn memory access patterns of the containers. However, they incur 
large slowdown compared to other processors. It is worthwhile to mention that unlike 
SGX, which uses the Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) [133] to preserve the privacy of the 
user using the SGX in a remote host, these secure processors did not guarantee the 
privacy of the user. The user can be tracked by the identity of the processor he is using. 
Table 2 depicts existing secure processors and their characteristics. These processors are 
not suitable for IoT data processing because they target securing the data and the code 
coming from one user, which is not the case in the IoT paradigm as the data is coming 








Table 2: Summery of existing secure processors 
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Aegis [128] 2003     
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3.5 Summary and Discussion 
This section summarizes the findings of surveying the existing methods for securing 
users’ data in the cloud. Existing work in the literature is related to protecting users’ data 
from other users in the cloud and from external attacks while only few contributions 
considered protecting data from the cloud providers. In addition, most of them consider 
normal software approaches towards solving the problem which are not suitable in the 
absence of trusted computing in the cloud.  
For protecting users’ data from other users in the cloud, all the surveyed and possibly 
existing techniques are based on software approaches. The directions for these techniques 
include virtual machine isolation techniques and making cloud hypervisors more secure. 





of protection. Without doubts, these directions completely ignore the problem of 
protecting users’ data from cloud staff such as those who engineer and manage the 
hypervisors. 
There are several attempts found in the literature to protect data from cloud providers. 
These methods were hardware-based. However, no real implementation was reported and 
the proposed methods lack many factors to be implemented, discussed in detail in 
previous sections. These attempts do not consider trusted computing for their proposed 
methods. Providing trust for FPGAs is necessary if the FPGA is going to be put in the 
cloud. There is no relevant work proposed regarding this direction and mostly because 
FPGAs are used offline by the FPGA owner. Now, with the existence of FPGAs in the 
cloud for security, it will be mandatory to consider trust in the FPGAs and maintain the 
integrity of client’s applications running inside them. 
In traditional cryptography, encrypted data should be decrypted first to be processed. 
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a special type of cryptography that allows 
arbitrarily computation on encrypted data. This type of cryptography would allow for 
arbitrary computations on the cloud and the ability to store all data encrypted and 
performs computations on encrypted data. Unfortunately, as of today, FHE is not 
practical and introduce serious performance issues that would eliminate the original 
advantages of adopting cloud computing. 
Trusted computing in cloud computing is at its early stages. Trusted computing prevents 
devices owner from modifying the hardware of the devices which is exactly what the 
cloud needs to protect clients’ data. The concept of the cloud gives the clients the rights 





computing fits well in personal devices while, up to now, it is not fitting well in the 
environment that is supposed to do (i.e. the cloud). Therefore, the concept of trusted 
computing should be the basis for developing new trusted models for the cloud (i.e. 
hardware approach as it is for the TPM). Though, trust computing in its current form is 
not be possible to emerge to the cloud because of the multi-tenant nature of the cloud. A 
new approach most probably would dominate. The problem of preventing cloud 
providers from disclosing users’ data had to be tackled in hardware as introduced by Intel 
SGX. However, Intel SGX suffers from poor performance for medium/big data sizes and 
suffers from various kinds of attacks such as side-channel attacks.  
In summary, Table 3 shows, in general, different approaches that can be utilized or 
proposed for securing data in the cloud. Most of these approaches are HW-based and all 
of them have vulnerabilities/ weaknesses that could lead to disclosing clients’ data in the 
cloud. Further, it is obvious that these approaches are not suitable for IoT data processing 
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4 CHAPTER  
SECURING CLIENT DATA IN THE CLOUD USING 
FPGAs 
This chapter discusses our FPGA-based scheme for securing users’ data and applications 
in the cloud. This includes the protocols, and all the HW and SW components required to 
implement the proposed scheme. The chapter also discusses the benefits of the scheme 
such as perfect forward secrecy, FPGA authentication, a secure symmetric session key 
establishment between the on-cloud FPGA and the client, and user’s configuration 
integrity check while running in the cloud FPGA. The details of the complete proof-of-
concept prototype along with the cloud testbed for implementing the prototype is also 
provided; including resource utilization, Synopsys tool synthesis results area of about 
0.0265 mm2 in a state-of-the-art 16/14 nm fabrication technology if implemented as 
custom circuits on the FPGA (i.e. Hard Macros), and the boot time the FPGA take for the 











Cloud computing has proven to be of eminse benefits for individual users and enterprises. 
Reduction of capital costs, which is one of the essential benefits of cloud computing, 
makes cloud computing the ultimate choice for enterprises. However, protecting the 
integrity and privacy of users’ data is a major concern that hinders the adoption of cloud 
computing for applications with sensitive data such as financial data processing and 
medical data [134]. Existing solutions focus on protecting users' data against external or 
other users’ attacks only and they assume that the cloud provider is trusted. This leads 
many organizations with sensitive data not to process such data in the cloud [135] 
In this chapter, we discuss the proposed scheme for securing client data which has the 
following features: 
1. Practicality: The scheme does not use additional resources, other than the 
FPGA which is already deployed in the cloud [136], nor any special activities 
between the clients and the FPGA vendor. 
2. Secure client data processing: the scheme provides strong protection against a 
wide range of attacks including MiM attack, FPGA impersonation, replay 
attacks, etc. The scheme does not consider the cloud operator as a trusted 
party and it ensures the integrity of the client’ applications. It provides the 
standard overall protection as outlined in [137]. 
3. Suits the multi-tenant nature of the cloud. 
In Section 4.2, an overview of the proposed scheme is introduced including the protocol, 





results are presented in Section 4.3. This includes the complete cloud testbed 
implementation and the details of all components, their implementation details and 
performance figures. It also provides performance comparisons with conventional virtual 
machine boot times and other approaches such as Intel SGX. Section 4.4 demonstrates 
how our scheme can be used to protect intellectual properties (IPs) in the cloud. Finally, 
conclusions are presented in Section 4.5. 
 
4.2 The Proposed Scheme for Securing Client Data in the Cloud 
This dissertation presents a novel scheme that utilizes FPGAs to secure users’ data and 
applications in the cloud. The proposed scheme protects against various types of attacks, 
provides FPGA authentication, and ensures fixed logic and user’s application integrity, 
data confidentiality and configuration integrity. Architectures for integrating FPGAs into 
the cloud to implement the proposed scheme have also been developed and a complete 
prototype was implemented to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme. It 
should be noted that the scope of our proposed FPGA-based secure cloud computing is 
different from existing published work on integrating heterogonous resources with 
OpenStack, namely the SAVI test-bed [138].  Our goal is to use FPGAs in the cloud to 
secure the clients’ data while SAVI test-bed aims to make FPGAs a resource for cloud 
providers to utilize. Our scheme is more closely related to the user’s side while SAVI 
test-bed is more closely related to the provider’s side. Our solution is also very scalable 
(paramount to any cloud-based computing), thus have great potential for secure cloud-






Assumptions: In this work, we assume that the on-cloud FPGA devices have the 
following capabilities that most of which already exist in current FPGAs:  
– Uniquely identifiable using any public identifier such as a printed serial number 
or other means such as a unique device DNA, similar to that found in Xilinx 
FPGAs [140]. This nonvolatile, unchangeable and permanently programmed 
value can be used to authenticate FPGAs running client’s configuration. However, 
device DNA alone is not suitable for device authentication as was illustrated in 
[141]. 
– External reconfiguration and readback ports are disabled [142]. External ports 
such as JTAG and SelectMAP are used to program FPGAs and to read back the 
configuration in its current state inside an FPGA for debugging purposes. 
– Configurable through an internal configuration access port (ICAP) such as in 
Xilinx devices [142]. An ICAP receives the configuration bit stream from the 
Static Logic and partially configures another portion of the FPGA. Hence, the 
FPGA should also support partial reconfiguration, 
– Supports readback of static configuration contents such as Look-Up-Tables, 
interconnects, and I/Os only, but cannot readback dynamic data such as RAM or 
Flip-Flop contents. 
– Have standard high-speed communication ports such as 100 Gigabit Ethernet to 





 FPGA Static Logic 
We assume that, in the future, FPGA manufacturers would provide adequate support for 
securing users’ data and applications on their FPGAs. Specifically, we assume that cloud-
based FPGAs would have the necessary static or fixed logic in the form of hard macros 
(i.e. non-configurable static logic) that supports different security schemes. These macros 
include a PUF and masking circuitry to generate random numbers to be used by the 
modular exponentiation circuit for Key generation, modular exponentiation circuit, AES 
block for Encryption/Decryption, SHA3 for hashing the b, authenticating the FPGA and 
hashing the configuration readback that is used by the client to ensure that his/her 
application is not modified, and a controller to coordinate the different activities. Figure 
12 shows these components and the connection between them and main state control is an 
FSM that controls the operation of these components. It should be noted that the 
proposed scheme could be implemented using current FPGAs that do not have the 
required Static Logic outlined above. The Static Logic in this case would be provided by 
the board manufacturer as pre-configured circuitry on FPGAs on tamper-proof boards 
and packages. Boards should be shipped with batteries and be powered constantly to 
maintain the Static Logic’s configuration. Users’ circuits, are placed into specific FPGA 
regions via partial reconfiguration. Only the input/output of the Encryption/Decryption 
would be made available to the users. This alternative solution allows anyone to make 






 The Overall Framework 
Notation: PUF-RN is the on-FPGA, n-bit, PUF-generated random number that is read 
once by the manufacturer and cannot be read again or altered. The session mask M, is 
also an n-bit random number generated by a trusted authority. M is used to generate an L-
bit random number b from the PUF-RN. RN is a secure random number generated by the 
client. Bit(client) is the partial bit stream representation of a client’s design. Config is the 
actual FPGA configuration obtained through readback using ICAP. Encryption of a 
message msg using a key k is denoted as MSG := Enc(msg,k) and the corresponding 
decryption as msg: =Dec(MSG,k). We use E_BIT(client) to denote encrypted bit streams: 
E_BIT(client) :=  Enc(Bit(client),k). F symbolizes an FPGA device. ID(F) is the 
identifier value and is used to uniquely refer to a specific FPGA. 
Involved parties: Figure 13 shows the parties involved in our proposed scheme. In 
addition to the client and the Cloud Provider (CP) who is providing FPGA-based 
processing as a service, the FPGA Vendor (FV) who sells FPGA devices to cloud 




















operators also acts as a trusted authority (TA). It is not necessary that the FPGA 
manufacturer be the TA. Alternatively, an OEM (board) manufacturer could act as the 
TA. In this case, it will get the PUF-RN from the manufacturer.  
 
Figure 13: The proposed framework of the scheme.  
 
 The Security Protocol 
The proposed 10-steps protocol for securing users’ data on the cloud using FPGA 
processing is illustrated using the sequence diagram in Figure 14: 
• The client sends a request for a physical resource (i.e. the FPGA) to the CP. The 
CP assigns an FPGA for the client and sends back its identifier (ID(Fi)), 
• The client forwards the ID(Fi) to the TA, which has the value generated by the 
PUF and stored in the PUF-RN for each FPGA. The TA responds with the 
following FPGA authentication credentials; a session mask M (a random n-bit 
number with exactly L number of 1s), hash of the L-bit number b concatenated 





are public values with g usually being a small integer such as 2 and p being a 
prime number satisfying the conditions Length(b) ≥ length(p) and gb ≥ p, 
• The client forwards M and its own portion of the session key, ga mod p, to the CP 
and requests FPGA authentication credentials. Similarly, ga must be ≥ p, and 
Length(a) ≥ length(p). The FPGA will use M to generate b using the masking 
circuitry described in Section 4.2.5. The FPGA uses b to generate its portion of 
the session key, gb mod p, hash (b+ ID(Fi)), gb mod p and sends the result back to 
the client. The client can now authenticate the FPGA by comparing the values of 
Hash (b+ID(Fi)) and gb mod p received from the TA and CP. This prevents MiM 
and FPGA impersonation attacks [26]. Both parties now share the symmetric 
session key gab mod p, completing the Ephemeral Diffie–Hellman key exchange 
[26]. At this point a and b are destroyed by the client and the FPGA, respectively. 
In addition, the session key will be destroyed at the end of the session so as to 
achieve the desirable security feature of Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), 
• The client encrypts his/her circuit’s configuration bit stream Bit (client) using gab 
mod p, and sends it to the FPGA. The fixed logic on the FPGA will then decrypt 
it and use it to configure the FPGA through the ICAP, 
• To protect against any circuit tampering (e.g. HW Trojans or sniffing circuitry 
inserted on the FPGA), the client chooses a secure random value RN, encrypts it 
with the session key gab mod p and sends it to the FPGA requesting configuration 
readback. The Static Logic decrypts RN, reads back the FPGA configuration, 
hashes it with RN, encrypts with the session key, and sends it back to the client. 





repeated any number of times (with a new RN every time to prevent replay 
attacks), during the operation of the client’s circuit on the FPGA.  
The steps above are repeated for every session and M is never repeated. It should be 
noted that this scheme also supports 3rd-party provided circuit IPs (i.e. the circuit is 
provided by an IP vendor). In this case, to protect the circuit IPs, the IP vendor will 
encrypt the circuit IP(s) using a different Mask and key (obtained through similar steps), 









Figure 14: The protocol sequence diagram. 
  
A slight variation on the protocol, Figure 15, could be made so that the TA does not need 
to compute gb mod p while still providing strong protection against MiM attacks. In this 
case, the FPGA sends the double hash Hash(Hash(b(M) + ID(Fi)) + gb mod p) along with 
gb mod p to the client. The client then computes the same double hash (using Hash(b(M) 
+ ID(Fi)) received from the TA and gb mod p received from the FPGA) to authenticate 
the FPGA. This version of the protocol requires slightly more cycles to compute the 







Figure 15: A variant of the protocol. Double hashing is computed by the FPGA and the client to 
avoid sending gb mod p by the TA. 
  
 The Masking Circuitry 
The masking circuitry, as shown in Figure 16, consists of an n-bit PUF-RN and M 
registers (for instance 2048 bit) and an L-bit register for the produced b. M consists of 
exactly L-bit ones distributed randomly over the bit locations in the M register, as 
illustrated earlier in Figure 17. The M and PUF-RN registers are shifted/rotated right and 
the bit shifted from M is checked if it is equal to one or not. If the value is equal to one, 





discarded. Therefore, after n cycles, the b register will be holding the L-bit random 
number to be used in modular exponentiation for Diffie–Hellman key exchange and 
SHA3. To illustrate the operation of the masking circuitry, Figure 17 shows an example 
of producing a 4-bit b with n equals 8 and L equals 4. Note that since b is 4-bit, M 
contains exactly 4 1s.  
 




Figure 17: An example of producing an L-bits b from n-bits PUF-RN and M; n in this example 











The TA role in this masking is just a simple shuffle of the M upon new M request. Then, 
TA can send the resulting shuffle, i.e. M, to the client with the hash value of the register b 
that is resulted when using such produced M in the masking circuitry. The TA also 
implements its management database for preventing the repetition of Ms and tracking 
them for each client. A sample implementation of the TA can be found in Appendix D. 
 
 Security Analysis   
The proposed protocol as illustrated in Figure 14 and Figure 15 provides FPGA 
authentication, configuration integrity check and data confidentiality in the cloud 
environment. It provides one-way authentication only; the client authenticates the FPGA 
while the FPGA does not authenticate the client. The CP is responsible for authenticating 
the client. It also minimizes communication between the client and the TA. 
 As was explained above, the steps of the protocol are repeated for every session, the 
session mask (M) is never repeated for stronger protection and b is never disclosed as a 
plaintext to the client or to any other party. This enable the use of Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman yielding Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). Therefore, even if the FPGA internal 
PUF-RN is leaked, all previously encrypted exchanges remain secure as the session keys 
cannot be re-created. Values of a and b are deleted by the Client and the FPGA, 
respectively, once each side establishes the session key. Also, all session keys are deleted 
at end of session. Furthermore, the width of the hash function output should be at least 





Figure 18 illustrates how FPGA impersonation is prevented by providing the hash of the 
b and the ID(Fi). Let an attacker (t) try to impersonate an FPGA with ID(Fi). The TA 
sends the client the hash Hash(b(M) + ID(Fi)) which must match the hash received from 
attacker t. In this case, the client receives Hash(b(M)* + ID(Fi)) and gt mod p which do 
not equal Hash(b(M) + ID(Fi)) and gb mod p. Hence, Fi impersonation by the Attacker (t) 
is prevented, and replaying the hash to be sent by the Fi is also prevented because M is 
never repeated.  Integrity checking is also secured through the use of the symmetric 
session key, and replaying it is prevented through the use of a newly client-generated RN. 
 
 
Figure 18: FPGA impersonation prevention. 
  
Figure 19 illustrates how the proposed scheme prevents MiM attacks by using the 
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman. Such an attack would fail due to inability of the MiM to re-
compute the hash sent by the FPGA while providing the correct gb mod p. Exchanges 





standard Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol. This prevents a MiM attacker from 
obtaining the hash and the gb mod p values sent by the TA to the client (message 4 in 
Figure 19) which are needed to launch a successful MiM attack.  
 
Figure 19: Man-in-the-middle attack prevention. 
 
Invasive attacks are useless as the effort to de-package and read out stored keys during 
operation from one device cannot be used with other devices due to the use of PUFs that 
generates unique PUF-RNs. The invasive physical attack requires very sophisticated 
capabilities that are only available to few states and major microelectronic manufacturing 
companies. The same level of difficulty is true for Fault attack [144]. 
Non-invasive (including side-channel attacks) and Semi-invasive attacks are also 





perform the analysis. Moreover, no plaintext version of any encrypted data is ever made 
available to any party other than the one who generated it. To protect most of the physical 
attacks against the masking circuitry, which is introduced in our scheme, the PUF-RN 
could be inverted and stored in another register, Figure 20, such that the power traces 
expose nothing more than a monotonically increasing current to the attacker. That is, 
every shift to the b and its complement registers produces the same current. Also, the 
values in these registers are shifted; adding the current of these shifts to the newly shifted 
bit and making the current monotonically increasing. 
 
Figure 20: A masking circuitry resistant to physical attacks 
 
For protecting other components of the static logic such as AES from physical attacks, 
several methods already exist for this purpose such as [145] [146] [147] [148]. Table 4 
summarizes the attacks discussed in Section 0 and our countermeasures against them. 
Most network attacks target denial of services (data confidentiality is guaranteed using 







Table 4: Attack types and our countermeasures 
Attack category Attack type Countermeasure 
Cryptographic 
attacks  
known-plaintext  AES is resistant to this attack and the 
session key is needed by the attacker. 
Also, plaintext is not exposed to any 
party. 
chosen-plaintext  AES is resistant to this attack and the 
session key is needed by the attacker. 
Also, plaintext is not exposed to any 
party. 
ciphertext-only  This attack is the hardest to achieve 
because the attacker has no knowledge 
of anything except the ciphertext.  
chosen-ciphertext  AES is resistant to this attack and the 
session key is needed by the attacker. 
Also, plaintext is not exposed to any 
party. 
related-key  This attack is prevented since the PUF is 
random, unpredicted and unclonable 
known-key distinguishing This attack is not possible as the attacker 
must be a client to send to the FPGA 
Network attacks 
wiretapping Since the data is encrypted, this attack is 
prevented 
port scan This attack is not applicable to FPGAs 
as the attacker gains nothing from 
scanning the ports 
idle scan This attack is not applicable to FPGAs 
as the attacker gains nothing from 





protocol is used 
Man-in-the-middle MiM attack is prevented as shown in 
Figure 19 
impersonation FPGA impersonation is prevented as 
shown in Figure 18 
replay Replay attacks are prevented since M is 
never repeated and the use of client-
generated RN 
ARP poisoning ARP poisoning is prevented because the 
data is encrypted 
ping flood This attack is not applicable to FPGAs 
ping of death This attack is not applicable to FPGAs 
Smurf attack This attack is not applicable to FPGAs 
Physical attacks 




cache This attack is not applicable to FPGAs 
timing This attack is not applicable to FPGAs 
power analysis This attack is prevented using the 
masking circuitry in Figure 20 
electromagnetic This attack is prevented using the 
masking circuitry in Figure 20 
semi-invasive semi-invasive are prevented using the 
masking circuitry in Figure 20 
brute force This attack requires exponential time 
and can become infeasible if key length 
and hash function output are long 
enough 










Reverse engineering is prevented since 
readback is not possible 
tampering The Static Logic is installed by the TA 
and cannot be readback. The user 
application is sent to the FPGA in the 
cloud encrypted and it is decrypted 
inside the FPGA by the Static Logic 
after authenticating the FPGA. 
Furthermore, plaintext configuration is 
never obtained by any party other than 
the one that created it. Even if an 
attacker managed to install HW Trojans 
(after the clients configure their 
application), the repeated integrity 
checks would expose that to the client. 
cloning Our system prevents such an attack due 
to the use of PUFs, which produce a 
unique PUF-RN for every FPGA. 
Hence, cloning a configuration to 
another FPGA will result in incorrect b 
and the FPGA authentication will fail, as 
illustrated in Figure 19. In addition, the 
user can securely perform periodic 
integrity check to ensure that the FPGA 
is not modified while running the 
application. 
counterfeiting same countermeasures of cloning attack 
can be applied to prevent counterfeiting 





as the attacker must obtain the session 
key to send the invalid bitstream to the 
static logic for partial reconfiguration. 
Further, the static logic cannot be erased 
because external configuration is 
disabled. 
 
To verify the protocol and check if there are any vulnerabilities, a formal verification was 
carried. The tool used for verification is ProVerif, which is a well-known tool to verify 
security protocols [150]. ProVerif can analyze security protocols automatically under the 
assumption that the attacker is active; meaning that the attacker can send, receive and 
modify messages. ProVerif proves the secrecy (the attacker cannot obtain the secret), 
authentication and strong secrecy (the attacker cannot learn the changes made to the 
secret). The protocol was written using Pi calculus that is supported by ProVerif. The 
FPGA generation of the hash and gb mod p was done by the TA sending them to the 
FPGA so that the comparison in the client side is correct. The communication between 
the TA and the client/FPGA was secured using a shared key using DH. The output 
produced by ProVerif showed that our protocol is secure. The code of our protocol along 






4.3 Experimental Results 
In this section, the details of the FPGA prototype and the OpenStack cloud infrastructure 
are provided. The section introduces OpenStack and its components, integrating FPGAs 
with OpenStack components and the performance evaluation of our prototype.  
 
 Background on OpenStack 
OpenStack is a group of open source projects aimed to provide comprehensive cloud 
services. There are six main components of OpenStack summarized in this section 
including:  
1. OpenStack compute (called Nova): 
Nova is the component that manages the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud 
computing platform. It includes drivers that interact with the underlying 
virtualization. Informally, it is the worker that deploy virtual machines in to the 
hosts by using the virtualization layer (hypervisors). Nova is the most complicated 
component of OpenStack [28] because it deals with external hypervisors. The 
components of nova compute are: 
– Nova-api: accepts and responds to user’s compute API calls 
– Nova-conductor: acts as an intermediary between the compute node and the 
database node. This is to make the communication to the database from the 
compute nodes more secure. 
– Nova-scheduler: takes VM requests from a common queue and determine to 





– Nova-compute: creates and terminates VMs through hypervisor APIs such as 
KVM and Xen. 
2. OpenStack image (called Glance): 
Registering, discovering and retrieving virtual machines is done by using the 
glance component. This component is generally responsible for any operation 
related to the virtual machine image. 
3. OpenStack Networking (called Neutron): 
OpenStack Neutron is the network component of OpenStack. It is scalable and 
can be deployed in a separate server to scale the cloud. 
4. OpenStack Dashboard (called Horizon): 
OpenStack Horizon provides a graphical interface to the users and cloud 
administrators to access, monitor, and automate cloud resources.  
5. OpenStack identity (called Keystone): 
OpenStack Keystone is the identity management component of OpenStack and it 
authenticates the cloud components and cloud users. 
6. OpenStack block storage (called Cinder) and OpenStack object store (called 
Swift): 
OpenStack Cinder and Swift provide storage to OpenStack virtual machines. The 
difference between Cinder and Swift is that Swift is storing metadata related to 
objects while Cinder stores user data attached to a VM as blocks. 
These components are open source python codes and they communicate by using a 
central database installed in the controller node and use messaging software called rabbit 





complicated as illustrated in Figure 21. All components are connected to identity services 
and all components are accessible using the dashboard service.  
 
Figure 21: OpenStack Architecture shows the seven main components of OpenStack and 






 Testbed Implementation 
To evaluate the practicality and performance of the proposed scheme, a complete proof-
of-concept prototype of a cloud-based FPGA system has been implemented using 
OpenStack’s Juno release [151]. OpenStack was chosen because it is an open source, 
allowing it to be modified to integrate FPGAs into cloud infrastructure. It is currently 
used by about 70 % of cloud operators [152] and is highly ranked by researchers [153]. 
Figure 23 shows both, the logical cloud infrastructure as per OpenStack guide [28], and 
the implemented physical testbed. It consists of three nodes; Compute, Network, and 
Controller nodes. Two Intel PowerEdge servers each with 16 cores, 32 Gb of RAM and 
700GB hard disk were used for the compute and the network nodes while an i5 PC with 
4Gb of RAM and 500GB hard disk was used as a controller. Two Fixed Configuration 
Ethernet switches with 16 Gbps forwarding bandwidth, 32 Gbps switching bandwidth, 
and 64 MB/32MB DRAM/Flash memories provided the interconnection fabric within the 
cloud. SW1 is used for cloud management and SW2 is used for clients’ communications 
with their VMs and FPGAs. The cloud was attached to a LAN via the Network node as 
shown in Figure 23. There are two network interfaces in each of the Compute and 
Network nodes to setup the private networks necessary to setup the cloud. A 3rd interface 
is in the Network node for the virtual machines (VMs) to communicate externally and 
only one interface is needed in the Controller node to monitor the VM instances. Optional 
components are implemented in the compute node. The network and compute nodes 
contain br-int and br-ext (internal and external bridges, respectively) that are used to 
share the network interface to enable users to communicate with their virtual machines. 





implemented separately. This basic setup can be easily scaled up to thousands of compute 
nodes and additional networking nodes as needed. 
A Xilinx Virtex-6 LX 550T FPGA prototyping board, Figure 22, (with 1 Gbps Ethernet 
ports) was attached to the cloud as an autonomous HW resource using Python scripts that 
implement the driver-agent model supported by OpenStack as outlined in details in [154]. 
The FPGA is then scheduled and assigned to a client as a conventional VM and all the 








Figure 22: Xilinx Virtex 6 XC6VLX550T board 
 
A special user interface software that would run on a client’s workstation was developed.  
It manages the setup and operation of an FPGA-based computing node on the cloud. It 
handles all the communications between the client’s workstation and the on-cloud FPGA. 
Clients can use it to establish/manage a session on the cloud-based FPGA and handle all 
data transfers to/from the FPGA from/to the client’s workstation. It also handles all the 
messages with the TA (using a special port), performs the key generation, encryption and 





reports the total time elapsed in establishing the secure FPGA-based computing node on 
the cloud. The trusted authority’s server was emulated by a Python script running on the 
TA workstation on the LAN. It receives the client’s request, performs a random shuffle to 
produce M, compute gb mod p and the hash Hash(b(M) + ID(Fi)), and send them to the 
client. Since the TA is emulated within the same LAN as the client, Amazon cloud is 
‘pinged’ to estimate the latency of communicating with the TA. The Ping is done for 
different Amazon cloud locations using the CloudPing.info service [122]. On average, the 
ping command took around 290 ms from the testbed site. This represents the round-trip 
time taken to obtain the FPGA mask (M), gb mod p and the corresponding hash value 










Figure 23: The implemented OpenStack cloud. (a) OpenStack Cloud implementation logical 
architecture, (b) OpenStack Cloud implementation physical implementation. 
  
For prototyping purposes, the Static Logic blocks were implemented using the FPGA’s 
reconfigurable logic blocks. The Static Logic is made of the following components (a 





1. A 512-bit SHA3 hashing block to support 256-bit session keys. This circuit 
was designed and implemented based on the Keccak sponge function reported 
in [155]. The design required major changes to make it routable and to 
pipeline it (mainly rounds steps), 
2. A 256-bit AES crypto-engine based on an OpenCores core by M. Litochevski, 
and L. Dongjun [156], 
3. An OpenCore implementation of the modular exponentiation block (modexp) 
based on the Square-and-Multiply algorithm by McQueen [157],  
4. The PUF as a 2048-bit register containing a random number, and the masking 
circuitry (as shown in Figure 16), 
5. A main FSM to control the various signals and interactions of the static logic. 
An abstracted drawing of the FSM is shown in Figure 26. 
6. An Ethernet controller and a state machine to handle the data flow between 
the components. Sending and receiving packets FSMs are shown in Figure 24 


























The FPGA’s logic and memory utilization of the different Static Logic blocks are shown 
in Table 5 along with their maximum possible frequencies. These results show that even 
if the Static Logic components were to be implemented using the FPGA’s configurable 
resources they would consume relatively very low resources (~5% of LUTs, ~2.5% of 
flip-flops, ~1.1% of the available block RAMs, and ~0.5% of the available DSP 
multipliers). Prior work ([158]–[160]) reported similar results indicating that these types 
of functions can be implemented very efficiently on FPGAs.  
The Static Logic was also synthesized as a custom circuit to estimate its area if it was 
made as hard macros on the FPGA. The total gate count was 144,012 gates (total RAM 





and FFs count remain the same as the FPGA implementation).  Based on that, and to put 
this into perspective, the total area of the Static Logic as custom HW macros is estimated 
to be 0.0414 mm2 in a state-of-the-art 16/14 nm fabrication technology based on the 
International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) [161]. A typical state-of-
the-art FPGA would have a die area from few hundred mm2 to around 2,000 mm2 [162]. 
As shown in Table 5, the Static Logic synthesized on the FPGA was also relatively fast. 
All components used the 100 MHz FPGA board clock since that was more than enough 
to handle the board’s 1 Gbps Ethernet traffic. The SHA3-512 achieved a throughput of 
237MB/s and a latency of 27 cycles to process 64B of data. Hence, the extra hashing step 
for the variant protocol of Figure 15 will only add 27 cycles to the authentication time. 
Similarly, the AES-256 module had a throughput of 235MB/s and 40 cycles latency for 
16B of data. In fact, it only takes 17ms to encrypt/decrypt a 4MB file. Modexp 
component is rarely used and it is used only at the beginning of the session. It takes less 
than 0.7ms to perform modular exponentiation for 256 bit base and exponent with the 
256 bit modulus. The latency of our basic masking circuitry is 2048 cycles for the 2048 
bit PUF-RN. These components can be easily operated at higher frequencies to handle 
higher bandwidth Ethernet links.  
Figure 27 illustrates the required behavior of the on-FPGA Static Logic. Upon receiving 
M and ga mod p from the Ethernet controller, M_valid and ga_mod_p_valid signals 
should go high for one clock cycle.  M_valid strobes the masking circuitry to produce b 
which would be used by the modexp and SHA3 modules to start producing gb mod p and 
the corresponding hashes. g was set to 2 and p to a 256 bit random number. Once 





Similarly, gb_mod_p_valid should go high for one cycle when gb mod p becomes valid. 
The FPGA can then receive the encrypted configuration, decrypts it, and then use the 







Table 5: Static Logic resource consumption. 









































































* ~ 264 Kb out of 22,752 Kb total. 
 
Figure 28 shows the actual signals obtained from the implemented prototype using Xilinx 
Chipscope (a technology that allows real-time monitoring of on-FPGA buses). Only the 
least 32 significant bits of each bus are displayed in Chipscope since the maximum 
triggers that can be shown in Chipscope is 256 bits. In addition, the signals were captured 
from three successive runs. In the 1st run (Figure 28(a), M is first received, then ga mod p 
is received, b is generated by the masking circuitry, then hash(b+ ID(Fi)) is computed and 





the values that were sent/computed in the 1st run, then gb mod p is computed followed by 
gab mod p. However, since each modular exponentiation operation takes about 70,000 
cycles, ChipScope is only triggered before the last 100 cycles or so gb mod p generation 
(gab mod p generation is not shown). Finally, for the 3rd run, Figure 28(c) shows 
receiving the encrypted configuration and decrypting it (the Chipscope output cursor 
position shows the decrypted configuration synch word “665599AA”). As this Figure 
shows, the implemented Static Logic achieves the correct required behavior. 
 
 









Figure 28: Chipscope screenshots showing the various signals of the implemented Static Logic. (a) 
Receiving M, ga mod p and producing the hash value, (b) gb mod p generation, (c) Receiving the 







To evaluate the practicality of the proposed scheme, the setup time of an FPGA-based 
computing node on the cloud was measured and compared to conventional SW-based 
virtual-machines image boot time on the same cloud. Figure 29 shows a snapshot of the 
user interface SW. It shows the sequence of events to establish a secure session on the 
FPGA.  Table 6 shows the boot times for various virtual machine instances with CirrOS 
images on the OpenStack-based cloud implementation testbed. The boot requests were 
issued from a client workstation on the same LAN as the cloud testbed. CirrOS is a 12 
MB OpenStack small Linux based operating system image that is used for testing images 
in OpenStack clouds.  
As Table 6 shows, it took 41 seconds to boot a medium size VM within the same cloud. 
Using the same client-cloud configuration, a secure FPGA-based computing node (with 
10 MB configuration file) is booted in about 2.8 seconds as shown in Figure 29.  This is 
about 15 times faster than a medium size VM on the same cloud. Moreover, considering 
a client having an internet connection with a speed equals to the global average speed of 
the internet (i.e. 6.3Mb/s [163]) he/she can establish a session from his/her location to the 







Figure 29: The user C# interface showing the message exchanged during session establishment. 
 
  
Table 6: Boot time (in seconds) for different virtual machine sizes on the implemented OpenStack 
cloud. 
VM Size Virtual cores RAM Disk Ephemeral Storage Boot time(sec) 
xlarge 8 16 GB 10 GB 160 GB 52 
large 4 8 GB 10 GB 80 GB 46 
medium 2 4 GB 10 GB 40 GB 41 
small 1 2 GB 10 GB 20 GB 34 
tiny 1 512 MB 1 GB 0 GB 30 
 
 
To evaluate the performance of our scheme and compare its time with Intel SGX, an 
image processor was used as a user application. The image processor was compiled from 
c using chips2 [164] and is performing images (bitmap format) edge detection using 





send the images and receive the output. The design work at the Ethernet speed of at least 
80 Mbytes/s. The synthesis report of the image processor is in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: The image processor resource utilization 
FF 560 (0.0815 %) 
LUTs 1278 (0.3719 %) 
BRAMs 11 (1.7405 %) 
Frequency 199.233MHz 
 
The experiments for measuring SW (python) performance were carried on a Xeon 
machine with the following specifications; Intel Xeon CPU with 8 core 3.20GHz, 23.5 
GB of memory, 2 TB of disk, and 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04 OS. The experiments were carried 
over 1G bits of data and Table 8 reports the time it takes for different percentage of the 
1G bits of data, where normal python script time to process the data in plaintext is 6.03 
seconds. FPGA_1GE is an FPGA with 1 Gbps Ethernet and FPGA_10GE is an FPGA 
with 10 Gbps Ethernet.  Compared to Intel SGX results obtained from [166], our solution 
is much faster for larger data making it more suitable in terms of performance to cloud 
applications and streaming analytics. Results of [166] depicted that a data larger than 8 
MB (which is the L3 cache size) will make the SGX 5.5x slower due to the overhead of 
cryptographic operations performed while the data leaves the CPU package and a data 
beyond 92 MB (which is close to the maximum size of 128 MB of the EPC of Intel SGX) 
will cause Intel SGX to be 200x slower due to the overhead associated with Intel SGX 





SGX is to keep the data encrypted out of the SXG enclave and the client application 
enters the enclave when needed. This includes calling the enclave, reading the encrypted 
data, decrypting it inside the enclave, processing the data, encrypting the results, exiting 
the enclave and writing the enclave data back to the disk. This way, the data may be 
processed in smaller chunks; reducing the overhead associated with larger data and 
avoiding page swapping. However, entering the enclave to process sensitive data is 
highly dependent on the application using the enclave. Also, entering and leaving the 
enclave is costly as illustrated by Zhao et al. [127] and considering an enclave call per 
8000 instructions leads to an overhead of 467% compared to executing instructions 
without calling an enclave. In our comparison, we assume the overhead of processing 
chunks greater than 8 MB and less than or equal to 90 MB to be 5.5x as this is the 
minimum slowdown reported in [166]. This slowdown is also reasonable for streaming 
applications (like our image processor) that has no data dependency, which makes it 































% from 1Gb SGX FPGA_1GE FPGA_10GE 
134.22 100 33.18 5.03 3.52 
120.80 90 29.86 4.53 3.17 
107.37 80 26.54 4.03 2.82 
93.95 70 23.23 3.52 2.47 
80.53 60 19.91 3.02 2.11 
67.11 50 16.59 2.52 1.76 
53.69 40 13.27 2.01 1.41 
40.27 30 9.95 1.51 1.06 
26.84 20 6.64 1.01 0.70 
13.42 10 3.32 0.50 0.35 
12.08 9 2.99 0.45 0.32 
10.74 8 2.65 0.40 0.28 
9.40 7 2.32 0.35 0.25 
8.05 6 1.99 0.30 0.21 
6.71 5 0.06 0.25 0.18 
5.37 4 0.05 0.20 0.14 
4.03 3 0.04 0.15 0.11 
2.68 2 0.02 0.10 0.07 






4.4 Client’s Circuit Intellectual Properties on the Cloud 
The problem of protecting Client’s Circuit IPs in the cloud is unique and different than 
protecting the IP in an FPGA owned by a client. The client is the party that sends the 
encrypted configuration to the cloud (including his application and the IP). Normally, 
protecting an IP in an FPGA owned by a client (i.e. one client) involves ensuring that 
only the FPGA that is supposed to use the IP is configured (i.e. prevent cloning the IP), 
which is not the case for the on-cloud FPGA as the FPGA assigned to the client is 
unknown to the IP core vendor (CV). Our scheme discussed in previous sections can be 
used to protect the IP core in the cloud from any party, including the client and the cloud 
provider. The scheme needs to be modified, as in Figure 30, to be used for protecting 
third party IPs. Basically, a static logic is needed to receive the IPs and it contains a 
controller that controls the masking circuitry and the ICAP interface for partial 
reconfiguration and a decryption module to decrypt the IP and its key. The steps needed 
to securely partially configure the on-cloud FPGA are as follows: 
1. CV enrolls IP to the TA by providing the key IP_key.  
2. TA encrypts the key using b that is produced by applying a mask m. 
3. TA sends the user M, the encrypted IP_key (Enc(IP_key))and hash of b. 
4. CV sends the IP encrypted using IP_key to the client. 
5. The user sends M to FPGA i. 
6. FPGA i generates b. 
7. User sends Enc(IP_key). 





9. Users sends encrypted IP. 
10. FPGA decrypts it and uses ICAP to configure the partial region of the IP. 
 
 
Figure 30: The framework for protecting IPs in the cloud 
 
The CV might need to check for integrity of its IP while running in the FPGA and a new 
mechanism should be developed to provide such checking. In our scheme, the hash of the 
IP should be sent to the client encrypted using the CV private key so that only the CV can 
decrypt the hash. 
The infrastructure for this modified scheme is similar to the original scheme when used 
for protecting client data who use IPs in his design from third parties, and only the main 
state control should be modified to accept more than one M and to store the CV’s private 
key. It is observed that this modified scheme is extending our proposed original scheme 





FPGA in the cloud. The FPGA static logic should be the same and only the FPGA 
management would be changed, as discussed by Stuart Byma and steffan [154]. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this work, a new FPGA-based scheme for securing users’ data (and applications) in 
clouds is proposed. It was shown that the proposed protocol for establishing a secure 
session on a cloud’s FPGA provides strong protection against various types of attack. A 
complete proof-of-concept prototype implementation of the scheme showed that it is 
feasible even with existing FPGAs, simple to implement, efficient in terms of resource 
utilization and takes less time to boot as compared to conventional software-based virtual 
machines.  The proposed scheme achieves perfect forward secrecy, provides 
authentication of the on-cloud FPGAs by the clients and integrity checking of client 
configuration to prevent any modification and/or other FPGA related attacks such as 







5 CHAPTER  
SECURE DATA PROCESSING FOR CLOUD-
INTEGRATED INTERNET OF THINGS USING FPGAS 
In this chapter, we describe our novel scheme to secure IoT data processing in the cloud 
from various kinds of attacks, including attacks from insiders. This includes the 
protocols, and all the HW and SW components required to implement the proposed 
scheme. The scheme achieves perfect forward secrecy, provides FPGA authentication, a 
secure way to establish a symmetric session key between the on-cloud FPGA, the IoT 
device and the client, and user’s configuration integrity check while running in the cloud 
FPGA. Furthermore, a symmetric proxy re-encryption (PRE) is proposed to suite the 
publish/subscribe systems of IoT. Not only does the implementation show the feasibility 
of the proposed scheme (in terms of applicability to current FPGAs), but it shows that it 
has very efficient resource utilization. Furthermore, synthesis results showed that this 
infrastructure logic would take a total area of about 0.0380 mm2 in a state-of-the-art 
16/14 nm fabrication technology if implemented as custom circuits on the FPGA (i.e. 
Hard Macros).  Experiments also showed that our proposed PRE is best suited in FPGAs 
for better performance. Our PRE takes less than 6 seconds to transform a ciphertext of 





5.1 Introduction  
Internet of things (IoT) is penetrating to all physical fields, including homes, 
manufacturers and urban spaces, and is expected to dramatically grow in near future. 
According to Gartner report [167], IoT devices are expected to reach around 21 billion by 
2020. This massive number generates a massive amount of data that need to be stored, 
aggregated and processed to make a value of the data produced by the IoT devices. 
Securing sensitive data collected from IoT devices is a crucial issue that needs to be 
considered and is one of the top issues in IoT ecosystems [168]. 
The amount of data collected from IoT devices is very large and the cloud is the natural 
paradigm for storing and processing such huge data. In fact, leading cloud companies 
already developed platforms for IoT such as Amazon AWS IoT [169], Microsoft Azure 
IoT Suite [170], and IBM Watson Internet of Things [171]. To this end, cloud computing 
can be thought as a marketplace for many services that share and handle the data. When it 
comes to the security of the data, it is the responsibility of the marketplace owner to 
provide adequate infrastructure for securing the data and it is the responsibility of the data 
owner to maintain the security of his data and use the right infrastructure in the cloud.  
In addition, IoT follow the publish/subscribe fashion and data come from multiple 
sources (publishers) and can be processed by any cloud component (subscriber). To 
secure such data in the cloud, a symmetric proxy re-encryption is needed to convert 
publisher’s ciphertext to a ciphertext that can be decrypted by the subscriber(s). The 
proxy re-encryption is needed to avoid decrypting the ciphertext while converting it and 
the proxy re-encryption should be symmetric to allow using symmetric encryption which 





However, the cloud is not fully secure for sensitive data of IoT devices, especially from 
insider attacks. Sensitive data requires much security mechanisms than any other security 
critical systems requires such as banks systems. Factories might be damaged and people 
might be injured or even die when such sensitive data is compromised. In the cloud, the 
IoT data becomes more valuable and more exposed to attacks when aggregated and 
processed to be presented.  
Compared to conventional software-based systems, FPGA configuration does not require 
the involvement of operating systems, drivers or compilers, making them suitable to build 
security solution under more robust attack models and stronger security guarantees. 
FPGA holds potential to deliver more sophisticated solutions for modern machine-to-
machine communication and big data applications [5]. FPGAs can be used to process 
data in the edge (near the IoT devices) or can be integrated with other cloud HW 
resources to form flexible, scalable, independent and secure compute resources within the 
cloud infrastructure. Therefore, clients can securely use FPGAs to perform the 
computation of their sensitive IoT data in the cloud in a secure manner while utilizing the 
benefits of the cloud and the fast and secure computation of the FPGAs.  
In this work, a novel scheme that utilizes FPGAs to secure IoT data processing and 
secure the applications that use them in the cloud is proposed. The proposed scheme 
protects against various types of attacks, provides FPGA authentication, ensures fixed 
logic and user’s application integrity, and data confidentiality. Architectures for 
integrating FPGAs into the cloud to implement the proposed scheme have also been 
developed. Furthermore, a symmetric proxy re-encryption has been developed that suits 





and the proxy re-encryption in FPGAs and discuss their performance in detail. Our 
solution is scalable (paramount to any cloud-based computing), thus have great potential 
for secure cloud-based computing as discussed also by other researchers [139]. 
In Section 5.2 various business IoT architectures are reviewed and in Section 5.3 an 
overview of the proposed scheme is introduced, including the protocol, its security 
analysis, the related framework (HW and SW components), and the proposed proxy re-
encryption. Experimental results are presented in Section 5.4. This includes the complete 
implementation of the proposed scheme and proxy re-encryption in FPGAs and the 
details of all components, their implementation details and performance figures. It also 
provides performance comparisons between our FPGA-based proxy re-encryption and a 
software version of it implemented in python. Finally, conclusions are presented in 
Section 5.5. 
 
5.2 Cloud-Integrated IoT Security Models 
In this section, we discuss business cloud-integrated IoT platforms including Microsoft’s, 
IBM’s, Google’s, Amazon’s and Intel’s IoT platforms. The business models are studied 
because there are no clear research directions when it comes to IoT in the cloud. 
Figure 31 shows the architecture of Microsoft Azure cloud for IoT [172]. There are three 
parties in this architecture, the IoT client (the IoT device), the cloud and the client 
(personal mobile devices and business systems). The client is connected to the cloud and 
gives actions (commands) to the IoT device through the cloud (there is no direct channel 





The Components of the cloud are: 
• Cloud gateway: A cloud gateway is a system that enables remote communication 
from and to the IoT devices. 
• Provisioning API: to make the device known to the cloud. It includes registering 
and removing the device from the cloud, activating and deactivating the device. 
• Stream processors: typically moving or routing data without any transformation. 
• Device state store: stores IoT device information such as its ID and registry 
record. 
• App backend: The application back end implements the required business logic of 
the solution. 
• Solution UX: The solution user experience typically includes a website, but can 
also include web services and APIs with a graphical user interface in the form of a 
mobile or desktop app. 
• Business integration connectors and gateway(s): The business integration is 
responsible for the integration of the IoT environment into downstream business 
systems. Typical examples include service billing, customer support. 
• In addition to these components, Microsoft developed the data factory component 






Figure 31: Microsoft's Internet of Things security architecture [172] 
 
The IBM [173], Google [174], Intel [175] and Amazon [169] IoT architectures are 
similar to the Microsoft’s architecture and they use what they call pipelines to collect and 
aggregate data from the IoT devices. It can be seen from these architectures that the flow 
is similar and only the way of handling is different from provider to provider. Further, the 
data collected from the IoT devices are pre-processed and converted to be processed by 
an application backend.  
Research on IoT security falls mainly into efficiently authenticating IoT devices and 
securing the end-to-end communication. Due to the impracticality of standard security 
solutions for authenticating the constrained IoT devices, lightweight authentication 
methods were proposed. These methods include homomorphism [176], Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) [177] and DTLS protocol based authentication [178]. Commercial 
cloud based IoT platforms use industry-standard protocols such as TLS and X.509 to 
secure communication between the IoT devices and the cloud [172]. In addition, several 





key infrastructure [179], IPv6/6LoWPAN [180], integrating DTLS and CoAP [181] and 
SSL [182]. Researchers have also proposed various IoT security architectures and 
discussed technologies that can be used to support IoT security. Layered security 
architectures were proposed [183] [184] for IoT security and a security verification. The 
layers cover various techniques related to IoT security such as key management, 
encryption oracles and access control. These architectures conceptually cover various 
attacks and mitigation techniques in each layer. A middleware was proposed in [185] to 
meet the scalability and the high number of heterogeneous devices of the IoT system. The 
middleware mainly targeted developing a security algorithm to tackle packet sniffing, 
man-in-the-middle attack and identity spoofing in the IoT environment. An architecture 
based on lightweight identity based cryptography (LIBC) with elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC) was proposed in [186] to solve security issues related to cloud-
integrated internet of things environment. However, these architectures neither 
considered attacks from inside the cloud nor provided any or complete implementations 
to demonstrate their practicality. 
 
5.3 The Proposed Scheme 
In this section, we discuss our scheme that is compliant to the architectures discussed in 
earlier section. Particularly, we target the IoT data handling with the security added and 





In this work, we assume that the on-cloud FPGA devices have the following capabilities, 
similar to the capabilities assumed in Chapter 4, most of which already exist in current 
FPGAs:  
– Uniquely identifiable using any public identifier such as a printed serial number 
or other means such as a unique device DNA, similar to that found in Xilinx 
FPGAs [140]. This nonvolatile, unchangeable and permanently programmed 
value can be used to authenticate FPGAs running client’s configuration. However, 
device DNA alone is not suitable for device authentication as was illustrated in 
[141]. 
– External reconfiguration and readback ports are disabled [142]. External ports 
such as JTAG and SelectMAP are used to program FPGAs and to read back the 
configuration in its current state inside an FPGA for debugging purposes. 
– Configurable through an internal configuration access port (ICAP) such as in 
Xilinx devices [142]. An ICAP receives the configuration bit stream from the 
Static Logic and partially configures another portion of the FPGA. Hence, the 
FPGA should also support partial reconfiguration, 
– Supports readback of static configuration contents such as Look-Up-Tables, 
interconnects, and I/Os only, but cannot readback dynamic data such as RAM or 
Flip-Flop contents. 
– Have standard high-speed communication ports such as 100 Gigabit Ethernet to 
enable their in-cloud usage. 
We use IoT device to refer to IoT capable device, constrained IoT device or IoT gateway. 





with the cloud and the FPGAs. Client application and client are used interchangeably in 
this work. 
Figure 32 shows the parties involved in our proposed scheme. In addition to the client, 
the IoT device and the Cloud Provider (CP) who is providing FPGA-based processing as 
a service, the FPGA Vendor (FV) who sells FPGA devices to cloud operators also acts as 
a trusted authority (TA). It is not necessary that the FPGA manufacturer is the TA. 
Alternatively, an OEM (board) manufacturer could act as the TA. In this case, it will get 
the PUF-RN from the manufacturer. The cloud is positioned between the clients’ 
applications and the IoT devices and is used for data store and processing and also for 
command forwarding, as we consider that there is no direct communication between the 
client application and the IoT device (similar to the cloud business models of Microsoft 
[172] and IBM [171] for IoT). Therefore, IoT devices receive commands from the cloud 
and send data to the cloud to be stored and processed and can be viewed by the clients’ 
applications. The processing is secured in the cloud using the FPGAs. Data 
transformation is handled by the proxy. The trusted authority is an important party that is 






Figure 32: The framework of the proposed scheme.  
 
 Description of the Proposed Symmetric Proxy Re-encryption 
In order to handle the data from IoT device in the cloud, the cloud takes several steps to 
make a value of the data that usually comes from different IoT devices and get collected, 
stored, aggregated, and processed to form the final result. When the data is encrypted, the 
cloud processing backend would have to use different keys for each data they process and 
similarly the IoT device needs to send the data encrypted to a specific processing 
component which is not suitable for the cloud computing paradigm. Therefore, we 
propose a proxy re-encryption (PRE) that would be in the cloud and would transfer the 
data encrypted by the IoT devices keys to a data encrypted by the processing components 
keys and would make it possible to transform IoT data to be processed by any processing 
component without the need to resend the data by the IoT device. 
The proxy re-encryption is shown in Figure 33. User A wants to authorize user B to 





mod p, where gr mod p is user’s A private key. User A and B first share a session key gab 
mod p using Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange [26]. User A then sends the re-
encryption key (rK) to the proxy that is residing in the cloud. The rK is computed by 
multiplying the session key by the multiplicative modular inverse of the IoT device 
private key (gr mod p). The proxy uses the rK to convert the data by multiplying the data 
by rK and sends the result to user B. The data is now converted to the format data* gab 
mod p and user B can decrypt the data by dividing it by the shared session key (gab mod 
p). Observe that the scheme allows any number of users to share the data produced by 
user A. The division is done using the multiplicative modular inverse and all operation is 
done with the mod taken and hence the data going in/out to/from the proxy is of the same 
size. The proof of security of our scheme is straight forward and follows directly from the 
proof of BBS proxy re-encryption [59].  
The PRE can be used in the cloud for IoT data processing assuming that user A is an IoT 
device and user B is an on-cloud FPGA(s). Therefore, the proxy and the FPGA are in the 
cloud and they are geographically close to each other, which makes the conversion fast. 
The only operations that need communication outside the cloud are the FPGA 
authentication and the sharing of a session key with it. It is worthwhile to mention that 
using shared key in the PRE is a valid property in our case of using the PRE for IoT data 
conversion in the cloud since sharing the key should be performed between the IoT 
device and the on-cloud FPGA. 
The properties of the PRE discussed in Section 2.5 that are important in the cloud with 
FPGAs are highlighted below: 





2- Non-transitive: this is achieved in our PRE as the re-encryption key must be 
provided by the delegator. 
3- Collusion-resistant: this is not important property in the cloud environment and 
with the use of FPGAs. 
4- Non-interactive: The private key is needed to establish a session with the IoT 
device and our PRE is symmetric. 
5- Multi-use/Single-use: this property is not needed in the cloud. 
6- Key-privacy: our proxy is part of the pipeline infrastructure in the cloud and this 
property is not needed as the identity of the IoT device and the FPGA is handled 
by other cloud components rather than the proxy. 
7- Transparent: our PRE is transparent. 
8- Key-optimal: our PRE is key-optimal. 
9- Temporary: our PRE has temporary property. 
Our symmetric proxy re-encryption scheme brings the following advantages when 
processing IoT data in the cloud: 
– The whole process depends on key sharing and not on the data management, 
– The scheme is suitable for both the IoT ecosystems and the multi-tenant nature of 
the cloud computing. Any authorized party can use the data without the data 
source involvement, 
– The FPGAs and IoT devices remain as a worker or as a resource and they are not 





– The PRE makes it possible to secure the publish/subscribe system of the IoT 
devices and the on-cloud FPGAs. 
 
 
 The Proposed Security Protocol 
The proposed protocol for securing the communication between the client application, the 
IoT devices, and the on-cloud FPGA is illustrated using the sequence diagram in Figure 
34. The client application is a piece of software that is responsible for authenticating the 
FPGA, securely sharing keys with the FPGA, securely sending configuration bitstream 
and checking the configuration integrity while the configuration bitstream is running in 
the FPGA. On the IoT device side, the IoT device also needs to authenticate the FPGA 
and share a key with it. The IoT data is stored in the cloud using one key (gr mod p) and 
the IoT device gives delegation for the authenticated FPGA to decrypt and process the 
data. 





– The protocol is initiated by the client who sends a request for a physical resource 
(i.e. the FPGA) to the CP. The FPGA is assigned to one client and can receive 
data from multiple IoT devices. The CP assigns an FPGA for the client and sends 
back its identifier (ID(Fi)) (step 1 and step 2 in Figure 34), 
– The client forwards the ID(Fi) to the TA which responds with the following 
FPGA authentication credentials; a session mask M that consists of an n-bit 
random number with exactly L number of 1s, hash of the corresponding L-bit 
number b concatenated with ID(Fi), and the FPGA’s session key portion (gb mod 
p) (step 3 and step 4 in Figure 34). Note that both g and p are public values with g 
usually being a small integer such as 2 and p being a prime number satisfying the 
condition gb ≥ p. Similarly, ga must be ≥ p, 
– The client forwards M and its own portion of the session key, ga mod p, to the CP 
and requests FPGA authentication credentials. The FPGA will use M to generate 
b using the masking circuitry (step 5 in Figure 34). The FPGA uses b to generate 
its portion of the session key, (gb mod p), computes Hash(b+ID(Fi)), and sends 
the result back to the client (step 6 in Figure 34). The client can now authenticate 
the FPGA by comparing the values of Hash (b+ID(Fi)) and (gb mod p) received 
from the TA and CP. This prevents MiM and FPGA impersonation attacks [26]. 
Both parties now share the symmetric session key gab mod p, completing the 
Ephemeral Diffie–Hellman key exchange. At this point, a and b are destroyed by 
the client and the FPGA, respectively. In addition, the session key will be 
destroyed at the end of the session to achieve the desirable security feature of 





– The client sends his/her circuit’s configuration bitstream Bit(client) encrypted 
using gab mod p and the fixed logic on the FPGA will then decrypt it and use it to 
configure the FPGA through the ICAP (step 7 in Figure 34), 
– The CP broadcasts the ID of the FPGA to the client’s IoT device. The IoT device 
then sends the FPGA ID to the TA and the TA responds with a new mask (M1) 
along with the hash and the key portion of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange (gb1 
mod p). The IoT device requests FPGA authentication by sending M1 and its 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange portion (ga1 mod p) to the FPGA. The FPGA 
responds by providing the hash and the (gb1 mod p). The IoT device can then 
compare the hashes and keys portions received from both the TA and the FPGA 
(steps 8-12 in Figure 34). If there is a match, the session will be established. 
Otherwise, it will be terminated, 
– The FPGA encrypts the key (b1), which is generated by the PUF circuitry, using 
the session key established (ga1b1 mod p) and sends it to the IoT device (step 13 in 
Figure 34). The IoT device sends the re-encryption key (rK1 = b1/gr mod p) to the 
on-cloud proxy which in turn transforms the IoT device data that is encrypted 
using (gr mod p) to be encrypted using b1 as in the scheme discussed in Figure 33 
and sends the re-encrypted data to the FPGA (step 14 and step 15 in Figure 34). 
The FPGA receives M1 from the CP and regenerates b1 and decrypts the data and 
sends the result to the client after encrypting it using the session key (gab mod p). 
The value b1 is regenerated to avoid storing large number of keys thereby 
eliminates the need for memory resources needed to store the keys and allowing 





– To protect against any circuit tampering (e.g. HW Trojans or sniffing circuitry 
inserted on the FPGA), the client chooses a secure random value RN, encrypts it 
with the gab mod p and sends it to the FPGA requesting configuration readback. 
The Static Logic decrypts RN, reads back the FPGA configuration, hashes it with 
RN, encrypts with the session key, and sends it back to the client (steps 17 and 18 
in Figure 34). The client can use this to validate the integrity of the FPGA. This 
check can be repeated any number of times (with a new RN every time to prevent 











The steps above are repeated for every session and M is never repeated. For step 13 in 
Figure 34, b1 could be XORed with a private static FPGA number and the resulted key 
would be sent to the IoT devices instead of b1 to avoid exposing b1 outside the FPGA. It 
should be noted that this scheme also supports 3rd-party provided circuit IPs (i.e. the 
circuit is provided by an IP vendor). In this case, to protect the circuit IPs, the IP vendor 
will encrypt the circuit IP(s) using a different Mask and key obtained through similar 






 Security Analysis 
This section, similar to section 4.2.6, summarizes the possible attacks of our IoT scheme 
and the countermeasures the scheme is providing. Table 9 summarizes most popular 
attacks and describes what protection mechanism our scheme can provide to prevent 
these attacks. 
ProVerif [187] was used for automatic verification of the proposed protocol and to ensure 
that the protocol does not suffer from any vulnerabilities. The following assumptions 
were made: 
• We modeled the interactions between the IoT-device and the FPGA as this also 
models the interactions between the client and the FPGA, 
• The attacker has access to all communication channels except for private 
channels, 
• To verify the match of the hash values received from the TA and the FPGA in the 
IoT device side, these values are sent to the IoT device and the FPGA. The FPGA 
then send the value received from the TA to the IoT device to emulate the 
operations of the b generation and its corresponding hash value, 
• The channel between the IoT device/FPGA and the TA is private, 
• The attacker is active which means that the attacker has full access to all messages 
and can send or replay messages in the communication channels. 
Appendix C shows the ProVerif code of our proposed protocol which consists of the 
following parts: 





• Encryption/decryption and hash functions models are in lines 9-16, 
• The TA operations are in lines 19-22, 
• The IoT-device operations are in lines 23-29, 
• The FPGA operations are in lines 30-34. 
The results of this ProVerif code shows that the query is true; indicating that the protocol 
is free from vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 9: Summery of countermeasure against most popular attacks 




This attack is ineffective because the data is not decrypted 
by the proxy and the attacker sees encrypted data only. 
Proxy and IoT 




the IoT device 
If the proxy and the IoT device collude by impersonating 
the IoT device, the scheme is still secure since the b key is 








This attack is prevented by using the PUF-RN which is 
known to the FPGA and the TA only. Further, the private 




assumed to be a 
malicious 
insider who 





No plaintext version of any encrypted data is ever made 
available to any party other than the one who generated it 
(i.e. any data outside the FPGA is encrypted).  open key 
attack model is prevented using the PUF, which produces 
random uncorrelated numbers from which the key is 
generated. In addition, the steps of the protocol are 
repeated for every session, the session mask (M) is never 









device and the 
FPGA. 
a plaintext to the client or to any other party. 
Network attacks 








impersonation Prevented as shown in Figure 18 
MiM Prevented as shown in Figure 19 
replay Replaying the values to be sent by the 
FPGA is prevented because M is never 
repeated.  Integrity checking is also 
secured through the use of the symmetric 
session key, and replaying it is prevented 
through the use of the newly client-
generated random number (RN). 
Physical and 
FPGA attacks 
assumed to be a 
malicious 
insider that has 
access to the 
FPGA devices 
in the datacenter 
and is trying to 
obtain the 
device secrets 
and the IoT 
sensitive data. 
invasive 
Damage the FPGA and any divulged 
secrets such as the PUF-RN are useless 
because it is only unique to that FPGA. 
non-invasive 
All blocks of the static logic have constant 
processing time (i.e. cycles). Similarly, 
Power and Electromagnetic Radiation 
analysis attacks are mitigated due to the 
use of differential PUF-RN circuitry and 
similar techniques for the security 
components such as the RSA [188]; the 
power/electromagnetic profiles do not 
depend on the value of b or the shared 
key. 
semi-invasive 
The required knowledge and equipment 






5.4 Results and Discussion 
In this section, we describe the FPGA implementation of the proposed protocol and 
report its resource overhead as well as the PRE performance of both software and FPGA 
implementation.  
 
 FPGA Implementation 
To evaluate the practicality and performance of the proposed scheme, a complete proof-
of-concept prototype of an FPGA system has been implemented. A Xilinx Virtex-6 LX 
550T FPGA prototyping board (with 1 Gbps Ethernet ports) was used for the prototype. 
For prototyping purposes, the Static Logic blocks were implemented using the FPGA’s 
reconfigurable logic blocks. The Static Logic is made of the following components: 
– A 512-bit SHA3 hashing block to support 256-bit session keys. This circuit was 
designed and implemented based on the Keccak sponge function reported in 
[155]. The design required major changes to make it routable and to pipeline it 
(mainly rounds steps), 
– A 256-bit modular multiplier based on the interleaved modular multiplication 
algorithm [189], 
– An OpenCore implementation of the modular exponentiation block (modexp) 
based on the Square-and-Multiply algorithm by McQueen [157]. The modexp was 
also used to implement the multiplicative modular inverse,  
– The PUF as a 2048-bit register containing a random number, and the masking 





– An FSM, Figure 35, to control the components of the static logic. 









The FPGA’s logic and memory utilization of the different Static Logic blocks is shown in 
Table 10 along with their maximum possible frequencies. These results show that even if 
the Static Logic components were to be implemented using the FPGA’s configurable 
resources they would consume relatively very low resources (~5% of LUTs, ~2.8% of 
flip-flops, ~1.9% of the available block RAMs, and ~3.4% of the available DSP 
multipliers). Prior work ([158] [159] [160]) reported similar results indicating that these 
types of functions can be implemented very efficiently on FPGAs.  
The Static Logic was also synthesized as a custom circuit to estimate its area if it was 
made as hard macros on the FPGA. The total gate count was 112,877 gates (total RAM 
and FFs count remain the same as the FPGA implementation).  Based on that, and to put 
this into perspective, the total area of the Static Logic as custom HW macros is estimated 
to be 0. 0380 mm2 in a state-of-the-art 16/14 nm fabrication technology based on the 
International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) [161]. A typical state-of-
the-art FPGA would have a die area from few hundred mm2 to around 2,000 mm2 [162]. 
As shown in Table 10, the Static Logic synthesized on the FPGA was also relatively fast. 
All components used the 100 MHz FPGA board clock since that was more than enough 
to handle the board’s 1 Gbps Ethernet traffic. The SHA3-512 achieved a throughput of 
237MB/s and a latency of 27 cycles to process 64B of data. Similarly, the 256-bit 
modular multiplier takes 256 cycles to process 256 bits of data and can be enhanced by 
making multiple copies of it to work in parallel as will be discussed in Section 3.2 below. 
Modexp component is rarely used and it is used only at the beginning of the session and 
when calculating the modular multiplicative inverse of b using Fermat's little theorem as 





base and exponent with the 256-bit modulus. The latency of our basic masking circuitry 
is 2048 cycles for the 2048 bit PUF-RN. These components can be easily operated at 
higher frequencies to handle higher bandwidth Ethernet links.  
 
Table 10: Resource utilization of the Static Logic 
Static 
Logic 





17,386 19,443 12* 29 
234.9 
(5.06%) (2.83%) (1.89%) (3.36%) 
SHA3-
512 
7,573 2,211 0 3 
273.9 
(2.20%) (0.32%) (0.00%) (0.35%) 
Ethernet 1,302 1,045 12 19 
234.6 
Controller (0.38%) (0.15%) (1.89%) (2.20%) 
Enc-Dec 
2,107 773 0 0 
134.7 
(0.61%) (0.11%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 
modexp 
6,816 3,595 0 0 
130.6 
(1.98%) (0.52%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 
Masking 3,340 4,349 0 2 
430.3 
circuitry (0.68%) (0.68%) (0.00%) (0.23%) 
FSM 
2,488 2,460 0 2 
413.6 
(0.72%) (0.36%) (0.00%) (0.23%) 
* ~ 264 Kb out of 22,752 Kb total. 
 





Figure 36 shows the actual signals obtained from the implemented prototype using Xilinx 
Chipscope (a technology that allows real-time monitoring of on-FPGA buses). The 
capturing is done for establishing a session with an IoT device, which takes more steps 
than that establishing a session with the client as shown in Figure 34. Only the least 32 
significant bits of each bus are displayed in Chipscope since the maximum triggers that 
can be shown in Chipscope is 256 bits. In addition, the signals were captured from three 
successive runs and the values should match the values in the example in Table 11. In the 
1st run (Figure 36(a), M is first received, then ga mod p is received.  For the 2nd run, 
Figure 36(b), both M and ga mod p are set as their values in the first run as in Table 11, 
then b is generated by the masking circuitry, then hash(b+ ID(Fi)) is computed and sent 
back to the client. The third run (Figure 36(c)) is triggered when encrypted data is valid 
thereby capturing the values of gb mod p followed by gab mod p followed by the 
encrypted b that is sent to the IoT device. Figure 36(c) also shows the encrypted data and 
the decrypted data along with their valid signals. The encrypted data is supposed to be the 
same as re_data in Table 11. More snapshots of the design and its different components 












g 2 0x3 
q 256 0xd0a6b524f46f5a59520d3efcba360545d911e748700ff141b7414405bcd22c0b 
r 256 0x1b1ba9a04575d309395ed00546339621904dafe5094ed826d081af26407f00a2 
gr 256 0x1302d7d599d1ec79d677e7eee28c6b565841563b17f6f3146aebc36a6382d841 
a 256 0x14bb28715d971d180f7055e2098e1a8a2ff67c4090afc649dc69f2424f62ccec 
b 256 0xa78fa95736cab7d8031b46104c08a0ff0786b067ffdd011fd24fd330977b67d4 
ga 256 0x4b058bb3c58c38662bb2b8eb58534a24cba7e5194cedcb61c1f9cf5b0d890e78 
gb 256 0xf343a2e3522bba046a7ded8510fd2d17b6ac9faa0cb96f346a21b9668bd3164 
gab 256 0x6c528c1cef10ae5184e3f2a0f752b5fbb004928e80811282233b9847d3212e99 
data 256 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
gr*data 256 0x7d36a1a577e3b7aedc9a8fcafc0baa6628bf27ed613db443cb0e1984cbf6150 
rK 256 0x6e81c5e894ddb9371b6833cca4a8c39a96f79159d38ea7eee941cd9014063bb8 
re_data 256 0x78c9acbd53051363d7cb66ff097e2bf568ec52055b878311360594f27612d5ea 
Enc_b 256 0x97b894cce3b431462322142fec06a5d517b139ce288d92195336247f7ccf7c4f 

















Figure 36: Chipscope screenshots showing the operations of the implemented Static Logic on the FPGA. (a) 
Receiving M, ga mod p, (b) Producing b and the hash values, (c) Producing gb mod p, gab mod p, encrypted b and 






 PRE Implementation 
The PRE was also implemented in another Virtex 6 LX 550T FPGA. The proxy design 
can be installed once in an untrusted manner since the data is not decrypted in the FPGA. 
Our FPGA-based proxy consists of an Ethernet controller that receives TCP packets, 256-
bit modular multiplier, and an FSM to receive the rK key and accumulate the data into 
256 bits chunks to be multiplied by the rK. The components of the FPGA along with their 
maximum proxy are shown in Table 12. The synthesis results suggest that our proxy can 
be implemented in low-cost FPGAs and there could be many multipliers working in 
parallel. For a 1 Gbps Ethernet link, 10 bits can be processed every cycle. For this reason, 
we decided to make a BRAMS for buffering the data that is received/sent from/to 
Ethernet link and 10 multipliers to work in parallel such that 250 bits of the product result 
are outputted every cycle, ignoring the latency off filling the BRAMs and computing the 
first product result at the beginning.          
Table 12: FPGA resource usage by the PRE Logic. 
PRE 
Logic 



















































Figure 37 shows an example of our implemented proxy for the result and signals of one 
multiplier. The image is triggered when the rk_valid signal goes high and it shows the 
data_valid signal goes high. The last signal of the image is the result_valid signal and it 
goes high when the result is ready or when in an ideal state. The rK is as in the example 
in Table 11 and the data is what is received from the IoT device (gr mod p*data). 
 
 
 Performance Evaluation 
Our proxy re-encryption can be seen as a packet processer since nothing more receiving 
the data and outputting the converted result is required. The natural way for 
implementing packet processors is the FPGAs as explained in more details in [190]. 
To evaluate the performance of our FPGA implementation of the proxy, we compare it 
with a software-based version implemented in python 2.7 (the script can be found in 
Appendix D). We used a workstation with Intel Xeon CPU with 8 core 3.20GHz, 23.5 
GB of memory, 2 TB of disk, and 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04 OS. To evaluate the software 
performance, two experiments were carried out. The first experiment is to make the data 





available for the SW in arrays which means the data is entirely in the memory. For 
precise measurement of the time of the SW version, the measurements were repeated 
10000 times and the average of 10 runs was taken; producing the 1000 measurements in 
Figure 40 for 1Mb of data. The minimum time was set to be the actual value and the 
maximum time was set to be the experimental value and the percentage error was 
calculated and found to be 2.76% only.  
The second experiment was carried out by measuring the performance of the SW by 
reading the data from the disk to model the actual performance as it is the case when the 
SW runs in the cloud. Figure 42 shows the trend line of 1Mb of data. The percentage 
error was found to be 3.80% only. 
The FPGA implementation makes use of the data initialized in the BRAMs. Based on 
these setups, Figure 38 shows the time it takes in seconds for both experiments and the 
for the FPGA and Figure 39 and Figure 41 depict the speedup of the FPGA 
implementation over the SW implementations. Reading the data from the disk is about 
1.76x slower compared to reading the data from the memory. It can be noticed from 
Figure 42 that there are some small jumps due to accessing the disk. The speedup is 
shown in Figure 39 and Figure 41 for both experiments. The FPGA implementation is, on 
average, 5.8 times faster than the SW implementation while the data in memory and 
about 10.26 times faster than the SW implementation when the data is read from the disk. 
Given the speedup obtained, if the Ethernet link speed is 10 Gbps instead of 1 Gbps, the 
speedup will be about 58 when the data is read from the memory and about 102.6 when 







Figure 38: Time comparison of the PRE FPGA implementation and the SW PRE. In the SW 





Figure 39: The speedup obtained by our PRE FPGA implementation over PRE SW 
























































































Figure 40: The time of the python PRE over 1000 runs. The data is read from the memory. 
  
 
Figure 41: The speedup obtained by our PRE FPGA implementation over PRE SW 


































































































Figure 42: The time of the python PRE over 1000 runs. The data is read from the disk. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
In this work, a new FPGA-based scheme for securing IoT data in clouds is proposed, 
including a symmetric proxy re-encryption. It was shown that the proposed protocol for 
establishing a secure session on a cloud’s FPGA provides strong protection against 
various types of attack. A complete proof-of-concept prototype implementation of the 
scheme showed that it is feasible even with existing FPGAs, simple to implement, 
efficient in terms of resource utilization and suites the publish/subscribe model.  The 
proposed scheme achieves perfect forward secrecy, provides authentication of the on-
cloud FPGAs by the clients and integrity checking of client configuration to prevent any 


























6 CHAPTER  
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this dissertation, we studied the existing techniques for the problem of securing client 
data in the cloud. Based on this, we proposed a novel scheme based on FPGAs to tackle 
this problem. We developed all the SW/HW components of the scheme and proposed 
protocols to securely communicate with the on-cloud FPGAs. We also showed that our 
scheme can be easily integrated in the cloud as a cloud resource with a boot time that is 
15x faster than booting a conventional VM. We also showed that in terms of 
performance, our solution is faster and more secure than existing solutions such as Intel 
SGX. 
Moreover, we extend the space of our solutions to more challenging security situations 
such as securing IoT data in the cloud. The results depicted that our scheme for handling 
IoT data is efficient in terms of FPGA resource overhead and performance. We also 
handle securely the transformation of encrypted IoT data in the cloud by proposing a 
symmetric proxy re-encryption. Our proxy re-encryption performance was reported and 
suggested that it is best suited for FPGAs to perform the transformation, which is at least 
6x faster than Xeon machines when using the 1G Ethernet and is at least 60x faster when 
using the 10G Ethernet. 
This work can be extended in many ways. It opens huge opportunities for many 
contributions. An obvious extension is using our work for securing client data for 





exploiting FPGAs for application that can be parallelized such that the benefits of 
security and speed can be combined by using our schemes. For IoT and smart grids, our 
solutions can be extended to function as a web services in the FPGAs and exhibit the 
machine-to-machine communication, in which FPGAs are well suited for and is expected 
to dominate in this field since the FPGAs brings the flexibility for bringing the 
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APPENDIX A: FPGA Implementation and Simulation 
a. Client Data Protection Scheme Components 
 
RXD input  8-bit bus for receiving data from the Ethernet chip 
RX input Unused signal 
RXDV input Valid signal for the received data 
RXER input Error signal for the received data 
TXD output 8-bit bus for transmitting data to the Ethernet chip 
TX output Unused signal 
TXEN output Enable signal for data transmission 
TXER output Error signal for the Transmitted data  







Figure A 2: Implementation of the design placed in Xilinx Virtex 6 device. 
 
 






TX_STB input Transmit strobe  
RX_STB output Receive strobe  
















DOA input 16-bit bus for data received from the Ethernet controller 
Start_End input Signal to start/end the session 
AES_key_valid input Signal to indicate that the AES can encrypt/decrypt the data 
busy output Signal to indicate that the FSM is not able to receive new data 
from the Ethernet controller 
AES_start output Signal is used for the AES key expansion which is performed 
at the beginning of the session.  
Enc_Dec output Signal for the AES to encrypt or decrypt the data 






Figure A 7: Protocol block and inputs/outputs 
 
 







i_key_mode input 2-bit bus for specifying the key length (0 = 128; 1 = 192; 2 = 256) 
o_data_valid output data output valid 
o_ready output indicates AES is ready for new input data at the next clock cycle  







byte_num input Number of bytes per block 
is last input Signal to indicate the last block 
buffer_full output Unused signal. For debugging purposes 
Figure A 10: SHA3 module  
 
 
Figure A 12: The output of SHA3 when out_ready goes high 
 
 






Figure A 13: The result of SHA3 
 






Figure A 15: The operations of modexp, producing 3b mod p (b is exp and p is mod in the figure) 
 
 
Figure A 16: The operations of modexp, producing 3ab mod p  
 






















b. IoT Scheme Implementation Related Components: 
 












Figure A 22: Modular multiplication module 
 
 







Figure A 24: The value of the encrypted data zoomed 
 
 










Figure A 26: The operations of modexp, producing the multiplicative modular inverse of b 
 
 







APPENDIX B: ProVerif Code for the client sensitive data 
protection protocol 
(* Diffie-Hellman without signatures resists active attacks 
A -> B : e^n0 
         B -> A : e^n1 
           A and B compute the key as k = (e^n0)^n1 = (e^n1)^n0 
         A -> B : {s}k 
*) 
free c.(*a channel used to send/receive messages between the parties *) 
free c1. (*a channel used to send/receive messages between the TA and the client/FPGA 
*) 
private free s. (*a message to be send securely upon executing the protocol *) 
(* active adversary *) 
param attacker = active. (*Active means that the attacker can intercept messages send 
,receive or modify messages *) 
(* Shared key cryptography *) 
fun enc/2. (*encryption function with 2 inputs *) 
reduc dec(enc(x,y),y) = x. (*the corresponding decryption*) 
fun hash/1. (* the hash function with 1 input *) 
(* Diffie-Hellman functions *) 
fun f/2. (*a function used to represent gab=gba *) 





equation f(x,g(y)) = f(y,g(x)). (*the corresponding equation of the function f *) 
(* Test whether message s is secret *) 
query attacker:s. 
(* The TA process *) 
let TA = new n00; new b; new n1;   
(*using channel c1 to share a key with the client and the FPGA*) 
         (out(c1,g(n00))  | in(c1,x11); let k = f(n00,x11) in out(c1, 
enc(g(n1),k));out(c1,enc(hash(b),k))). 
(*The client process *)    
let client = new n0; new n11;  
(*sharing a key with the TA *) 
         (out(c1,g(n11)) | in(c1,xx);  
                         let k = f(n11,xx) in  
                         in (c1,m);  
(*receiving gb and hash(b) from the TA *) 
                         let gb_TA = dec(m,k) in 
  in (c1,m1);  
                         let hash_b = dec(m,k) in 
(*receiving gb and hash(b) from the FPGA *)  
   out(c,g(n0)) ; in(c,gb_FPGA)| in(c,hash_FPGA); 
(*authenticating the FPGA *) 
   if gb_TA=gb_FPGA then 





   if hash_b=hash_FPGA then 
(*if authentication done, send the message s *) 
   let k1 = f(n0,gb_TA) in out(c, enc(s,k1)) 
   ) 
   else 
  ( 
   0) 
  ). 
(*The FPGA process *) 
let FPGA =  new n01;  
(*sharing a key with the TA *) 
         (out(c1,g(n01)) | in(c1,yy);  
                      let k = f(n01,yy) in  
                         in (c1,m1);  
(*receiving gb and hash(b) from the TA *) 
                         let gb = dec(m1,k) in 
   in (c1,m2);  
                         let hash_b1 = dec(m2,k) in 
   in(c,x0);  
                         let k1 = f(gb,x0) in  
(*sending gb and hash(b) to the client*) 
   out(c,gb); 





                         in (c,m3);  
(*receiving the message s  from the client *) 
                         let s3 = dec(m3,k1) in 0). 
 






APPENDIX C: Proverif code for the IoT sensitive data 
protection protocol 
1. (* Diffie-Hellman representation 
2. A -> B : e^n0 
B -> A : e^n1 
A and B compute the key as k = (e^n0)^n1 = (e^n1)^n0 
3. A -> B : {s}k *) 
4. free c.(*a channel used to send/receive messages between the parties *) 
5. free c1. (*a channel used to send/receive messages between the TA and the 
IoT_device/FPGA *) 
6. private free s. (*a message to be send securely upon executing the protocol *) 
7. (* active adversary *) 
8. param attacker = active. (*Active means that the attacker can intercept messages send 
,receive or modify messages *) 
9. (* Shared key cryptography *) 
10. fun enc/2. (*encryption function with 2 inputs *) 
11. reduc dec(enc(x,y),y) = x. (*the corresponding decryption*) 
12. fun hash/1. (* the hash function with 1 input *) 
13. (* Diffie-Hellman functions *) 
14. fun f/2. (*a function used to represent gab=gba *) 
15. fun g/1. (*the exponent ion function *) 
16. equation f(x,g(y)) = f(y,g(x)). (*the corresponding equation of the function f *) 
17. (* Test whether message s is secret *) 
18. query attacker:s. 
19. (* The TA process *) 
20. let TA = new n00; new b;  
21. (*using channel c1 to share a key with the IoT_device and the FPGA*) 
22. (out(c1,g(n00))  | in(c1,x11); let k = f(n00,x11) in out(c1, 
enc(g(n1),k));out(c1,enc(hash(b),k))). 
23. (*The IoT_device process *)    
24. let IoT_device = new n0; new n11;  
25. (*sharing a key with the TA *)          
26. (*receiving gb and hash(b) from the TA *) 
let gb_TA = in (c1,m);  
let hash_b = in (c1,h) in 
27. (*receiving gb and hash(b) from the FPGA *)  
out(c,g(n0)) ; in(c,gb_FPGA)| in(c,hash_FPGA); 
28. (*authenticating the FPGA *) 
if gb_TA=gb_FPGA then 
( 
if hash_b=hash_FPGA then 





let k1 = f(n0,gb_TA) in out(c, enc(s,k1)) 
)else(0)). 
30. (*The FPGA process *) 
31. let FPGA =  new n01;  
32. (*receiving gb and hash(b) from the TA and receiving ga from the client *) 
let gb = in (c1,m);  
let hash_b1 = in (c1,h); in 
in(c,x0);  
let k1 = f(gb,x0) in  
33. (*sending gb and hash(b) to the IoT_device*) 
out(c,gb); 
out(c,hash_b1); 
in (c,m3);  
34. (*receiving the message s  from the IoT_device *) 
let s3 = dec(m3,k1) in 0). 






APPENDIX D: Python Scripts 
The TA: 
import numpy as np 
import random 
import math  
from keccak import * 
g = 3 
p = pow(2,256) 
import socket  
# create a socket object 
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)  
 
# get local machine name 
IOTdevice_IP = "" 
IOTdevice_port = 9998 
s.bind((IOTdevice_IP, IOTdevice_port))  
s.listen(1) 
conn, addr = s.accept() 
print 'Connection address:', addr 
# Receive FPGA ID 
FPGA_ID = conn.recv(1024)  





K = 256 #K ones 
M = np.array([0] * (N-K) + [1] * K) 
zeros = ['0']*(N-K) 
ones = ['1']*K 
M = zeros+ones 
random.shuffle(M) 
 
with open('RN.txt') as f: 
    arr01 = f.readline() 
# with open('mask.txt') as f: 






for i in range(0, len(M)): 
    if(M[i]=='1'): 
  b[ii]=RN[i] 










gb =pow(g,int(''.join(b), 2),p) 
#print str(gb) 
# SHA3 operatins 
pt = (str(int(''.join(b), 2))+FPGA_ID).decode('ascii') 
H = Keccak512(pt).hexdigest() 
#print pt 
#print H 
# Send M 
conn.send(''.join(M)) #int(''.join(M), 2) 
#M=bin(M) 
#print (''.join(M)) 
# Send gb 
conn.send(str(gb)+" "+H)  
#print str(gb) 











    ''' 
    The multiplicitive inverse of a in the integers modulo p. 
    Return b s.t. 
    a * b == 1 mod p 
    ''' 
    return pow(a,p-2,p) 
 
g=3 
q=   0xd0a6b524f46f5a59520d3efcba360545d911e748700ff141b7414405bcd22c0b 
r=   0x1b1ba9a04575d309395ed00546339621904dafe5094ed826d081af26407f00a2 
gr=  0x1302d7d599d1ec79d677e7eee28c6b565841563b17f6f3146aebc36a6382d841 
a=   0x14bb28715d971d180f7055e2098e1a8a2ff67c4090afc649dc69f2424f62ccec 
ga=  0x4b058bb3c58c38662bb2b8eb58534a24cba7e5194cedcb61c1f9cf5b0d890e78 




rK=(ga*invmod(gr,q))%q# to be sent to the proxy 
E_data=(data*gr)%q 
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